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3 **BEFORE THE WESTERN WASHINGTON GROWTH**
4 **MANAGEMENT HEARINGS BOARD**

5 ACHEN, et. al.,)
6)
7 Petitioners,)
8 vs.) No. 95-2-0067
9)
10 CLARK COUNTY, et. al.,) FINAL DECISION
11) AND ORDER
12 Respondents,)
13)
14 and)
15)
16 CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS, et. al.,)
17)
18 Intervenors.)
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And so begins the tome.

During the last stages of the most recent ice age, some 12,000 to 14,000 years ago, the most significant catastrophic geological event in the history of the planet left its mark on eastern Washington and on Clark County. The Lake Missoula - Columbia River catastrophic flood events of that time deposited sand, gravel, and silt over the floor of Clark County, raising it to an elevation of 350 feet. During those events, millions of gallons of water flowed at 60 m.p.h. or more throughout eastern Washington to the mouth of the Columbia River. Flooding occurred from as far south as Eugene to an area north of Clark County. Volumes of water, one-half the size of Lake Michigan, would empty in a period of two days and wreak havoc throughout and around the course of the Columbia. While these catastrophic flood events, first discovered by Jay Harlan Bretz in the 1920's, affected eastern Washington to a greater degree, the geological impact to Clark County was significant and remains today.

1 Forty-one miles of the imposing Columbia River form the western and southern
2 boundaries of Clark County. Its northern boundary follows the course of the Lewis
3 River. The foothills of the Cascades form the only non-river boundary to the east.
4 Approximately 110 miles inland from the Pacific Ocean, at the confluence of the
5 Willamette and Columbia rivers, lies the urban core of the Portland metropolitan area.
6 The southern cities of Clark County adjoining the Columbia River form a quadrant of
7 that metropolitan area, and are greatly influenced by it in terms of economic,
8 transportation, and cultural factors. That metropolitan area constitutes the largest
9 economic and population center on the west coast between San Francisco and Seattle.
10 With a land area of 627 square miles, Clark County ranks 35th in the State, but as of
11 1990, ranked fifth in terms of population. As of 1990, only 30% of the population lived
12 within the incorporated cities of Clark County (Ex. 77).

13 Not unlike the Missoula floods, an unprecedented volume of petitions began arriving at
14 our office on February 28, 1995. Eighty-five different petitioners filed 61 separate
15 petitions that challenged Clark County's comprehensive plan (CP) and development
16 regulations (DRs) adopted December 29, 1994. Some of the petitions also challenged
17 the comprehensive plans and development regulations adopted by the cities of
18 Vancouver, Camas, Battle Ground and Ridgefield, which plans were adopted shortly
19 before or after the action of Clark County. During the entire 3-year growth management
20 planning process, all the cities and Clark County had worked together with the goal of
21 achieving consistent CPs and DRs that would be adopted within the same general time
22 frame.

23 Subsequent to the formal adoption of Clark County's comprehensive plan and
24 development regulations, staff noted the presence of scrivener errors in the printed
25 documents. Subsequently, a public hearing was held to correct the errors and resulted in
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1 a change of designation to what was originally intended in a portion of Clark County.
2 Yet another petition was filed on April 3, 1995, which was within the 60-day period
3 after publication of the corrected designation.
4

5 Ultimately, nine days of hearings on the merits were held in Vancouver. The hearings
6 occurred over a 3 week period commencing June 19, 1995, and ending July 7, 1995. In
7 the intervening months between the filings of the petitions and the hearings on the
8 merits, weeks of prehearing conferences and motions hearings were held.

9 During the interlude between filing and hearings, Clark County acknowledged that some
10 revisions to the CP and DRs were needed. Seven of the original 62 petitions were
11 voluntarily remanded by stipulation between the parties. Five other petitions were
12 dismissed either voluntarily or by stipulation. During the motions portion of our
13 process, we dismissed 3 other cases; one for filing beyond the 60-day period of RCW
14 36.70A.290(2), one because the petitioners failed to participate in either the prehearings
15 or motions process, and one that involved plat covenants that were unaffected by the
16 County's actions.

17 Forty-four different parties were granted intervenor status in various petitions. Of the
18 original 85 petitioners, approximately one half involved property specific challenges
19 while the remainder set forth more generalized issues. Intervenors consisted of entities
20 such as all school districts in Clark County, the Clark County Homebuilders
21 Associations, Vancouver Chamber of Commerce and various individuals and
22 corporations. Most of the intervenors involved parties who supported the actions taken
23 by the County and the various cities. A small number of intervenors were involved in
24 the property specific challenges, generally in support of the actions of Clark County.
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1 Over 20 attorneys represented different parties. While there was not a breath of conflict
2 of interest from the multiple representations, there were occasionally some very
3 interesting changes in the dynamics of arguments. Of the original 62 petitions, 23 were
4 consolidated for purposes of argument. We declined to consolidate all cases prior to the
5 hearings on the merits to avoid each petitioner having to serve pleadings on over 100
6 other parties. Ultimately, on July 19, 1995, after all the hearings had been completed,
7 we did issue an Order of Consolidation for all pending cases for purposes of issuing one
8 final order and dealing with any subsequent motions.

9 During the motions portion of the process, Clark County challenged the right of a
10 number of petitioners to proceed with their cases. Of the approximately 35 *pro se*
11 petitions, Clark County challenged most for the failure to serve a copy of the petition on
12 the County. Some of the petitioners failed to serve a copy on any representative of
13 Clark County, some failed to serve the Auditor, and some failed to serve the Auditor
14 until weeks after filing the petitions. Clark County acknowledged that it suffered no
15 prejudice as a result of these late or nonexistent services since all of the ones not served
16 by a petitioner had been received from our office. By a series of orders we declined to
17 dismiss any of the cases under the provision of WAC 242-02-230, since there was no
18 showing of prejudice to the County. The City of Battle Ground filed a similar motion on
19 a petition challenging its comprehensive plan, which was also denied.

20 Clark County also moved to dismiss the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA)
21 challenges asserted in 5 different petitions. The County acknowledged that each of the
22 petitioners had standing under the Act but asked that we impose a different standing
23 requirement for SEPA challenges. By Order dated May 24, 1995, we declined to do so
24 and held each of the petitioners had standing to challenge SEPA actions or nonactions.
25
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1 The record ultimately presented to us consisted of designations from the record below of
2 Clark County, Vancouver, Camas, Washougal, Battle Ground, and Ridgefield.

3 Additionally, supplemental evidence requests were made by a number of parties,
4 including many of the intervenors. Most of the requests involved matters that were part
5 of the record and overlooked in the designations, or material that was available to the
6 decision makers during the growth management planning process. Some, but very few,
7 documents outside the record that were available prior to the December 20, 1994,
8 decision of the Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) of Clark County, were
9 admitted. No materials generated after December 20, 1995 were admitted.

10 One petitioner, Clark County Citizens United, Inc. (CCCU), requested that affidavit or
11 testimonial evidence be presented concerning their challenge to the adequacy of the final
12 supplemental environmental impact statement. We decided to wait until the completion
13 of our review of the record and the hearings on the merits to rule on that request. By
14 Order dated July 18th, 1995, we determined that further evidence supplemental to the
15 record would not be of assistance or necessary for us to reach our decision. The motion
16 by CCCU was denied.

17 During the prehearing conference process we encouraged each of the parties to
18 coordinate briefing and argument such that duplication would be avoided. We
19 specifically noted in each prehearing order that failure of a party to argue a specific issue
20 would not constitute a waiver of that issue. We also discouraged intervention by an
21 existing petitioner in other cases solely to protect later rights of appeal. The parties
22 cooperated with this direction, and in our view, no party has waived any argument or
23 position on any issue.

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1 The planning process in Clark County began in October 1991. It involved staff from the
2 eight cities and towns and Clark County, as well as individuals, groups, special districts,
3 other agencies, and utility providers. A process, known as the *Prospectives Program*
4 included a steering committee of mayors and county commissioners and a staff-driven
5 technical advisory committee, which included school districts, utilities, ports, and issue-
6 based subcommittees. Nine newsletters were sent to every household in the County,
7 which included two separate mail-in surveys. Three random sample telephone surveys
8 were done. Eight specific issue papers were mailed to people who had indicated an
9 interest. A toll free telephone hotline was established, as were speakers bureaus, a
10 monthly cable television series, workshops, planning fairs, and open houses each
11 Wednesday night. The public participation process culminated in a lengthy series of
12 joint public hearings before the County Planning Commission and BOCC.

13 In July 1992, Clark County adopted its county-wide planning policies (CPP) (Ex. 1).
14 The County then embarked on adoption of a more comprehensive policy that involved a
15 community visioning process. A final environmental impact statement (FEIS) (Ex. 77)
16 was issued March 5, 1993, and the County then adopted a "community framework plan"
17 (CFP) some 60 days later (Ex. 2). The purpose of this subsequent CFP was stated in
18 county brief number 1 at page 2 as follows:

19 "...The Framework Plan provided policy direction for both the County and the
20 cities in the development of the 20-Year Comprehensive Plan. The Community
21 Framework Plan addressed the regional issues associated with the GMA process,
22 while the County-Wide Planning Policies, for the most part, addressed process
23 issues. . ."

24 During the 3-year planning process, numerous items of correspondence were received by
25 the county. The various citizen advisory groups and technical advisory groups met at
26 different times throughout the process. Interim Urban Growth Boundaries were

1 established in September 1993 following public hearings before the Clark County
2 Planning Commission and the BOCC.

3
4 A supplemental draft environmental impact statement (SDEIS) (Ex. 78) for the CP and
5 the first draft of the CP were available in June 1994. A supplement final environmental
6 impact statement (SFEIS)(Ex.79) for the CP was issued in early September 1994, along
7 with an updated draft of the CP. Shortly before the first joint public hearing, the
8 planning department staff published a recommended plan that added an "agri-forest"
9 designation to the resource lands element and eliminated the concept of rural villages and
10 hamlets that was included in earlier drafts.

11 The joint Planning Commission/BOCC public hearings commenced September 9, 1994,
12 and continued through November 30, 1994. Some 23 public hearings were held during
13 which members of the Planning Commission and BOCC were present. The BOCC
14 listened to the public testimony, but were not present for the deliberation portions held
15 by the Planning Commission. Verbatim transcripts of all public hearings were prepared
16 and submitted as part of our record. Some 38 separate staff reports were prepared
17 during the public hearing process.

18 When the Planning Commission had forwarded its recommendations, the BOCC held
19 another public hearing on December 13, 1994, and continued deliberations on the CP
20 and DRs for 5 days thereafter. On December 20, 1994, the CP and DRs were adopted.
21

22 Throughout this entire 3 year planning process, Clark County never complied with the
23 mandates of RCW 36.70A.060 and .170 regarding classification, designation, and
24 conservation of resource lands and protection of critical areas. Except for a new
25 wetlands ordinance which was the subject of *Clark County Natural Resources Council*,
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1 *et. al., v. Clark County (Clark County I)*, #92-2-0001, the County relied upon
2 previously adopted designations and zoning ordinances. Consistent with an earlier
3 decision by the Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Board, we recently
4 held in *Friends of Skagit County v. Skagit County (Friends of Skagit County)*, #94-2-
5 0065, (Dispositive Order dated May 26, 1995) that such reliance without formal action
6 of the BOCC did not procedurally comply with GMA.

7
8 No challenge to Clark County's failure to comply was brought until September 8, 1994,
9 when a petition was filed entitled *Rural Clark County Preservation Association v. Clark*
10 *County*, #94-2-0014. Since the CP was about to be adopted, a stipulation was entered
11 between the parties that dismissed the petition. The parties agreed that certain arguments
12 would be preserved for presentation if an appeal was filed after adoption of the CP and
13 DRs. Such an appeal was filed as part of this case. After a motions hearing in May,
14 1995, we determined that certain of those issues could be presented. They will be
15 discussed later in this Order. We declined re-examination of our final order in *Clark*
16 *County I*, that related to the Clark County wetlands ordinance that remained in effect.

17 With this general background of the actions of Clark County in adopting its CP and
18 DRs, we turn to the issues that were presented for resolution at the hearings on the
19 merits. In order to facilitate readability we will generally refer to any or a portion of the
20 petitioners as petitioners and specifically identify respondents Clark County and/or the
21 individual cities. Intervenors will be referred to collectively unless specific identification
22 is helpful to understanding the issues and/or the ruling.
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SEPA

A number of petitions raised SEPA challenges. In *Reading, et. al., v. Thurston County, et. al. (Reading)*, #94-2-0019, we established the parameters of our EIS review as follows:

1. The scope of review is *de novo*;
2. The adequacy of an EIS is determined by the "rule of reason"; and
3. The governmental agency's determination that an EIS is adequate is entitled to "substantial weight".

We pointed to a provision of SEPA, WAC 197-11-442(4), relating to the scope of a non-project action which states:

"The EIS's discussion of alternatives for a comprehensive plan,...shall be limited to a general discussion of the impacts of alternative proposals for policies contained in such plans,...and for implementation measures. The lead agency is not required under SEPA to examine all conceivable policies, designations, or implementation measures...."

The rule of reason directs us to determine "whether the environmental effects of the proposed action are sufficiently disclosed, discussed, and substantiated by supportive opinion and data." *Klickitat Cy. Citizens Against Imported Waste v. Klickitat Cy. (Klickitat Cy.)*, 122 Wn.2d 619, 644, 860 P.2d 390, 866 P.2d 1256 (1993).

Petitioners contended that the adopted CP dramatically limited the amount of land available for residential use and instead designated it to resource activities. Therefore, the FSEIS did not adequately discuss any "probable negative environmental impacts" from more intensive agricultural practices relating to water quantity, e.g., irrigation, or water quality, e.g., increased use of fertilizers and pesticides.

1 The FEIS for the Community Framework Plan (Ex. 77) indicated that such "adverse"
2 environmental impacts of agricultural practices would be later addressed. In the FSEIS
3 (Ex. 79) this information was addressed albeit in summary form. However, as in
4 *Klickitat Cy.*, the County here referenced its groundwater management plan (Ex. 912
5 volume 1 and 2) as authorized by WAC 197-11-640. Even assuming that petitioners
6 presented sufficient evidence to substantiate their claim, the incorporation of the 850
7 page groundwater management plan sufficiently disclosed the possible environmental
8 impacts from increased agricultural use.

9
10 Petitioners also claimed that the staff proposal of an agri-forest designation, which added
11 some 36,000 acres to previous comprehensive plan drafts' resource designations, and the
12 elimination of rural centers from the previous drafts, was beyond the scope of the
13 alternatives discussed in the FSEIS. Petitioners pointed to Ex. 93 which stated the
14 "permitted density of development on virtually all this additional acreage is substantially
15 less than what the EIS discussed." Thus, according to petitioners, a supplemental EIS (a
16 supplement to the supplement) or, at the very least, an addendum pursuant to WAC 197-
17 11-600(4)(c), was required.

18 WAC 197-11-405(4)(a) directs that a supplemental EIS is to be prepared if there are
19 "substantial changes to a proposal so that the proposal is likely to have *significant*
20 *adverse environmental impacts*" (italics supplied). While we do not say that in every
21 situation a reduction of residential development and replacement by a resource land
22 designation could never have "significant adverse environmental impacts," the record
23 here convincingly discloses that the agri-forest proposal did not have any significant
24 adverse environmental impacts. There was no requirement to prepare another
25 supplemental EIS. While an addendum would have been helpful and could have been
26

1 prepared, the County did not violate SEPA in failing to do so. The same reasoning
2 applies to the elimination of rural villages and hamlets from the CP.

3
4 Petitioners further contended that the FSEIS failed to address a "no action" alternative as
5 required by WAC 197-11-440(5). The FSEIS noted that a continuation of the existing
6 CP and zoning regulations had been evaluated in both the draft (Ex. 76) and final (Ex.
7 77) EIS for the community framework plan. This "no action" alternative was rejected in
8 those documents for which exhibit 79 was the supplement, i.e. FSEIS. Further
9 discussion was not required.

10 Finally, petitioners contended that the County failed to respond to comments on the
11 DSEIS in developing the final statement. WAC 197-11-500(4) provides that responding
12 to comments on a draft EIS is a "focal point" of the Act's commenting process. Here,
13 the FSEIS responses were contained in section 5. The County chose a range of available
14 responses under WAC 197-11-560(3). As shown by section 5 at pages 22 and 23, the
15 FSEIS did respond to the water quality issues raised.

16 GOAL SIX

17 Virtually every individual petitioner who challenged his/her comprehensive plan
18 designation, as well as a number of general petitioners, relied upon Goal 6 (property
19 rights) as one of the bases for Clark County's alleged noncompliance.

20
21 RCW 36.70A.020(6) states:

22 "Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
23 having been made. The property rights of landowners shall be protected from
24 arbitrary and discriminatory actions."

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1 Actually, Goal 6 contains two separate and distinct goals; (1) takings and (2) protection
2 from arbitrary and discriminatory actions. We have previously held in *Mahr v. Thurston*
3 *County (Mahr)*, #94-2-0007 (Dispositive Order dated August 7, 1994) that our
4 jurisdiction granted under the Act does not include resolution of violations of the U.S.
5 and/or Washington State Constitution. See also *Gudschmidt vs. Mercer Island*,
6 CPSGMHB #92-3-0006. Rather the "takings" prong of Goal 6 is to be reviewed to
7 determine if adequate consideration of that prong has been given by the decision makers.
8 The record in this case discloses that significant time and consideration was given to this
9 prong throughout all levels of the decision-making process. Consideration started with
10 the initial newsletter program in 1991, and continued through many of the reports. It was
11 discussed in staff reports and at the Planning Commission hearings, during the BOCC
12 hearings and deliberation, and was contained in the CP.

13 None of the petitioners alleging violation of this prong have sustained their burden of
14 proof to show that Clark County had an obligation under the Act to go beyond what was
15 done. We reject the request of petitioners to expand our jurisdiction to include a finding
16 that a "taking" had occurred. We are not authorized to do so under the Act, both for
17 jurisdictional and practical reasons.

18 The second prong of Goal 6 relates to protection of "property rights of landowners"
19 from "arbitrary and discriminatory action". As we noted in *Clark County I*, compliance
20 with GMA involves both the goals and requirements of the Act. Our four-question
21 analysis invokes a methodology of ensuring both procedural and substantive compliance.
22 Since neither "property rights of landowners" nor "arbitrary and discriminatory actions"
23 are defined in the Act we must discern legislative intent to reach a general definition that
24 can apply throughout this and future cases.

1 In attempting to define "arbitrary and discriminatory" actions, we note first that the
2 Legislature has used the conjunctive (and) rather than the disjunctive (or) form. This
3 indicates a legislative intent that the protection is to be from actions which are together
4 "arbitrary and discriminatory". The term arbitrary connotes actions that are ill-
5 conceived, unreasoned, or ill-considered. The term discriminatory involves actions that
6 single out a particular person or class of persons for different treatment without a
7 rational basis upon which to make the segregation.

8
9 The term "property rights of landowners" could not have been intended by the
10 Legislature to mean any of the penumbra of "rights" thought to exist by some, if not
11 many, landowners in today's society. Such unrecognized "rights" as the right to divide
12 portions of land for inheritance or financing, or "rights" involving local government
13 never having the ability to change zoning, or "rights" to subdivide and develop land for
14 maximum personal financial gain regardless of the cost to the general populace, are not
15 included in the definition in this prong of Goal 6. Rather the "rights" intended by the
16 Legislature could only have been those which are legally recognized, e.g., statutory,
17 constitutional, and/or by court decision.

18 We conclude then that this prong of Goal 6 involves a requirement of protection of a
19 legally recognized right of a landowner from being singled out for unreasoned and ill-
20 conceived action. We will use this test to measure the claims of the various petitioners
21 that are raised in this case. We note that in our four-question analysis question 3,
22 concerning reasoned consideration of appropriate factors and avoidance of inappropriate
23 factors, provides a nexus for determination of this test.
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REMANDS

Prior to the hearings on the merits, six different cases were remanded by agreement between Clark County and the petitioners involved. One other case was remanded that involved both Clark County and the City of Ridgefield. In each case, the local government acknowledged that it was necessary to revisit the action challenged. In order to forestall any question as to the effect of the remands, we note that in each case none of the particulars of the petition were presented for resolution by us. We therefore hold that in each instance of remand, any action or inaction by the local government if challenged would have to be the subject of a new petition. Since we have not issued any ruling on the merits of the petitions, we would not be in the position to adequately review the subsequent action of the local government by means of a compliance hearing.

RESOURCE LANDS

Primarily Devoted To

The foundational question raised regarding agricultural and forest designations involved both definitional sections of RCW 36.70A.030. Resource land that is "primarily devoted to" agriculture or forest is to be classified, designated, and conserved. Many of the petitioners maintained their property was not currently "primarily devoted to" either agricultural or forest uses.

Clark County countered that its obligation under RCW 36.70A.170 and WAC 365-190-050 and -060 was to classify and designate "land primarily devoted to" in the larger sense than contended by the individual petitioners. The "land" referred to in the Act, argued the County, was intended to be an area-wide description, rather than a specific individual parcel determination. It was upon this basis that Clark County focused its classifications and designations of agricultural and forest resource lands.

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2 In classifying and designating agricultural and forest lands, Clark County not only
3 considered WAC 365-190-050 and -060, but in fact used them exclusively. It was the
4 contention of at least one petitioner that prior to the County's consideration of these
5 guidelines required by RCW 36.70A.050, the County must first establish whether the
6 resource land was "primarily devoted to" agriculture or forest production. While this
7 interpretation has some facial appeal, a closer reading of the Act reveals the flaws in
8 such a restrictive reading.

9
10 The driving force for the classification and designation scheme of RCW 36.70A.170 is
11 found in the goals section of the Act. RCW 36.70A.020(8) states:

12 "Maintain and enhance natural resource-based industries, including
13 productive timber, agricultural, and fisheries industries. Encourage the
14 conservation of productive forest lands and productive agricultural lands,
15 and discourage incompatible uses."

16 We also note the significance of the findings section of Ch. 307, Laws of 1994, which
17 changed the definition of forest land from the "primarily useful for" to the "primarily
18 devoted to" criterion. Those findings by the Legislature reiterated the language of Goal
19 8 and in part stated that:

20 "The legislature finds that it is in the public interest to identify and
21 provide long-term conservation of those productive natural resource lands
22 that are critical to and can be managed economically and practically for
23 long-term commercial production of food, fiber, and minerals. Successful
24 achievement of the natural resource industries' goal set forth in RCW
25 36.70A.020 requires the conservation of a *land base sufficient in size and*
26 *quality* to maintain and enhance those industries and the development and
use of land use techniques that discourage uses incompatible to the
management of designated lands...." (emphasis added)

1 In view of these legislative declarations, it is clear that the "land" primarily devoted to
2 resource production is intended to be viewed as an area-wide determination, rather than
3 a site-specific analysis.

4
5 In *Olympic Environmental Council v. Jefferson County*, #94-2-0017, we addressed a
6 resource land classification and designation scheme. We quoted with approval a March
7 9, 1994, DCTED memo which said in part:

8 "[C]lassification and designation will be done on an area-wide basis in
9 consideration of the overall character of the land and the Natural Resource
10 Industries goal of GMA, as opposed to the specific characteristics of an
11 individual parcel."

12 The use of an area-wide designation process for resource lands was an appropriate
13 methodology for the County to employ.

14 CCCU challenged some of the area-wide agricultural designations as including land that
15 was not "primarily devoted to agricultural use." It was petitioners' contention that some
16 of the areas the County denominated "agricultural candidate areas" did not include even
17 a majority of the land within the area in current agricultural uses.

18 After review of the record, we hold that CCCU has failed to sustain its burden of proof
19 on this issue. Primarily and majority are not synonymous terms. While it may be
20 possible, however unlikely, for a county to overly-designate resource lands, that has not
21 been shown to be the case by this record.

22
23 Many individual petitioners whose property was designated contrary to their wishes
24 complained that their "rights" were violated by the use of an "arbitrary and
25 discriminatory" methodology and application of that methodology in the classification
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1 and designation process. None of those petitioners carried their burden of showing
2 either a legally-recognized right or that they were singled out for unreasoned or ill-
3 considered treatment.

4 5 Long-Term Commercial Significance

6 CCCU and many of the individual petitioners contended that much of the agricultural
7 resource land classified and designated by Clark County did not meet the definition of
8 "long-term commercial significance." Much of the support cited by petitioners for that
9 contention came from a report (Ex. 181) issued by the Farm Focus Group. This group
10 was a subcommittee of the Resource Lands Citizen Advisory Committee. It issued a
11 report that agreed with the criteria used for initial agricultural land designations.

12 However, a majority of the committee concluded that the commercially significant
13 criterion could not be met in Clark County. A minority report found that agricultural
14 resource lands were and would continue to be commercially significant for the long-
15 term.

16 A close reading of the majority report does not support the conclusion asserted by
17 petitioners. That report did not say that no commercially significant agriculture existed
18 or would exist in the long-term. It asserted that traditional large scale farming
19 operations, such as dairy and large acreage crops, were no longer viable. The report
20 acknowledged that different, and in some instances smaller scale, agricultural activities
21 would continue to be commercially significant in the long-term. The report concluded
22 that support of this other long-term, but smaller scale, commercially significant
23 agriculture could be achieved without requiring 40-acre and 80-acre minimum lot sizes.

24 The long-term commercially significant aspect of the agricultural and forestry
25 designations was a contentious and time consuming issue in the CP process. Hordes of
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1 information and testimony were presented to the decision makers in support of, or in
2 dispute of, a determination of commercial significance for the long-term. Many people
3 testified and submitted written evidence that it was impossible to "make a living" from
4 an operation of the size involved in their holding of property. However, they often
5 related that testimony to a lesser proposed minimum lot size than that recommended by
6 staff and others. Other evidence showed that many farms were made up of several
7 parcels of land, some of which was owned and some of which was leased. The 1992
8 agricultural census information disclosed that many farms nationally, and in Clark
9 County, were operated by people who had considerable non-farm income.

10 Our review of the record finds significant support for the ultimate conclusion of the
11 BOCC that the agricultural land and forestry land designations were lands of "long-term
12 commercial significance." Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of proving the
13 decision was an erroneous application of the goals and requirements of the GMA. The
14 County chose a decision that was within the reasonable range of discretion afforded by
15 the Act.

16 Agri-Forest

17 After publication of the draft CP and finalization of the Resource Lands Committee
18 report, staff concluded more resource lands existed than had been recommended for
19 designation. In part, the separation of the farm focus group from the forestry group had
20 led on occasion to exclusions of some resource lands from each category because those
21 lands were neither completely agriculture nor completely forest.

22
23 One week prior to the commencement of the joint Planning Commission/BOCC public
24 hearings, a staff report (Ex. 83) recommended adoption of a third resource land category
25 entitled "agri-forest." This category involved an additional 36,000 acres of resource
26

1 designation from that recommended by the CACs. Although a minimal amount of
2 discussion about such designation had taken place during the resource group meetings,
3 the record is clear that generation of this concept was primarily by planning department
4 staff. The rationale for this additional resource land category was that:

5 "...[T]his additional joint classification is recommended in order to
6 account for lands which were originally overlooked from consideration for
7 inclusion in either the agricultural or forestry category because they
8 exhibited characteristics common to both, such as a property being used
9 for both farm and forest activities, or a parcel suited to farming located
10 adjacent to a group of forested lands."

11 This new category became one of the most vilified and thoroughly discussed aspects of
12 the public hearings. It took up a large part of the deliberations of both the Planning
13 Commission and BOCC. This category added 7% of the total acreage of Clark County
14 to resource land designation. The CP explanation for this category was stated as:

15 "[I]t was found that there were a number of areas where farming activity
16 was occurring adjacent to forestry and vice versa or where parcels were
17 not picked up as both farming and forestry activity was occurring on the
18 site, with neither being the predominate use. Therefore, all the 'edges' of
19 the resource areas were reevaluated. Through this process, the category
20 of Agri-forest was developed which recognizes that both or either
21 resource activity may be occurring in this area."

22 Various petitioners attacked this category as not allowed under GMA, unsupported by
23 the record or violative of the public participation aspects of RCW 36.70A.140 and
24 .020(11).

25 The GMA directs that classification, designation and conservation of agricultural and
26 forest lands shall occur. CCCU contended that the Act's identification of specific classes
(agriculture and forest) implied a legislative intent to exclude any other classes. We do
not read the GMA as being so restrictive.

1 Goal 11 of the Act provides for maintenance, enhancement, and conservation of natural
2 resource lands and industries. Along with the requirements of RCW 36.70A.060, it
3 provides a logical basis for the proposition that a major concern of any comprehensive
4 plan is the conservation of lands that are producing, and can be anticipated to produce,
5 resource-based commodities for commercial purposes. The designation of resource
6 lands that do not precisely qualify as either agriculture or forest, but often have
7 characteristics of each, is a choice that is within the reasonable range of discretion
8 afforded to local decision makers under the Act.

9
10 CCCU also contended that evidence contained in the record did not support the County's
11 use of the agri-forest category. Much of this argument focused on the CAC resource
12 lands reports. That focus is too narrow. Regardless of the level of discussion by the
13 resource lands subcommittees, the agri-forest category was extensively discussed
14 subsequent to its presentation to the Planning Commission/BOCC. Sufficient evidence is
15 contained in this extensive record to show that a wealth of information, discussion and
16 written evidence existed to support the decision of the BOCC. Petitioners have failed to
17 carry their burden of proof to overcome the presumption of validity that attached to the
18 agri-forest category.

19 Various petitioners also attacked the use of aerial photographs by the County to
20 specifically locate agriculture, forest, and agri-forest designations. Our review of the
21 photographs, in conjunction with all of the record, discloses that the photos were a
22 useful tool for providing specific information and were appropriately used by the
23 County. What petitioners have overlooked in their complaints is that these photographs
24 constituted only a piece of the entire collage and were not used as the exclusive means of
25 designation. Public testimony, CAC recommendations, correspondence from property
26 owners, and staff research were also used. The classification system took into account

1 all of the criteria recommended by WAC 195-360-050 and -060. Only as part of the
2 designation stage (mapping) did the County use aerial photographs. Their use was to
3 implement the classification criteria.
4

5 A different group of petitioners, including Rural Clark County Preservation Association
6 (RCCPA), contended that the County was required to classify every tract of land
7 designated under the current use taxation scheme of RCW 84.34. Again, this contention
8 focuses on too narrow a piece of the entire collage. The Act does not require such an
9 automatic designation. Rather the benefits to landowners arising from the current use
10 taxation scheme is only one of many considerations to be used. Clark County
11 appropriately included it in that context.

12 We found disconcerting, however, the claims of individual property owners who
13 challenged a resource land designation on their property where the property was, and
14 had long been, placed in the current use classification system. We did not find
15 persuasive any of the site specific challenges to a resource land designation where the
16 property was receiving special tax benefits under the current use classification. We
17 found the arguments that the property was not currently being used for agricultural or
18 forest production to be disingenuous where the property was currently in that tax
19 classification.

20 The final claim made by many petitioners was that the public participation goals and
21 requirements of the Act were violated by the infusion of the agri-forest category so late
22 in the overall GMA process. We have previously held that public participation was
23 violated in two cases involving changes occurring late in the GMA process, *Berschauer*
24 *v. Tumwater (Berschauer)*, #94-2-0002 and *Moore-Clark Co. Inc., v. Town of LaConner*
25
26

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1 (Moore-Clark), #94-2-0021. The circumstances and record in this case differ
2 significantly from those cases.

3
4 The touchstone of the public participation goals and requirements of the Act involve
5 "early and continuous" public involvement. As we said in *City of Pt. Townsend v.*
6 *Jefferson County (Pt. Townsend)*, #95-2-0006, adequate and correct information must be
7 available to both the public and the decision makers at the earliest opportunity in order to
8 comply with the public participation aspects of the Act. Here, the agri-forest category
9 was first proposed by staff on September 23, 1994. Over the next 3 months the category
10 received extensive discussion and public participation. The ultimate decision on
11 including the 36,000 acres as a resource designation was not made by the BOCC until
12 December 20, 1994. While it may have provided better public confidence to have
13 included this category at an earlier time, the entire concept of resource land designation
14 classifications had been discussed since the beginning of the GMA process in 1991.

15 A close reading of both the *Berschauer* and *Moore-Clark* cases shows that in those cases
16 the noncompliance arose because of a combination of the nature of the change, as well as
17 the timing. In *Berschauer*, re-examination of the site specific designation arose as a
18 result of neighborhood complaints near the end of the entire comprehensive plan process.
19 Thereafter, a separate and distinct methodology was adopted for reconsideration of that
20 neighborhood only. The subsequent CAC recommendation received only cursory review
21 by the Planning Commission and city council. The designation was also inconsistent
22 with the remainder of Tumwater's comprehensive plan.

23 In *Moore-Clark* the town council adopted a 1% population projection near the conclusion
24 of its comprehensive plan process. We found a lack of authority by the Town to make
25 that determination. Additionally, we held that adequate notice had not been provided for
26

1 the decision. In combination with the reversal of the long-used 2.9% population
2 projection, a violation of public participation was shown. In neither of those cases,
3 however, did we hold that no changes could be made at the later stages of the GMA
4 process. Here, the change that was adopted to include the agri-forest land area was not
5 as dramatic or substantial as the changes made in *Berschauer* and *Moore-Clark*.

6 Additionally, a very thorough discussion was made by both the public and the decision
7 makers as to the reasons, impacts and necessities of the agri-forest designations. There
8 was no violation of public participation in adopting the agri-forest category.

9
10 RCCPA and others contended that the total resource land designations for the County
11 were insufficient and that resource land minimum lot sizes were inadequate. As to these
12 issues, petitioners have failed in their burden of proof to show noncompliance. The Act
13 provides a difference between interim resource land designations and DRs, and those
14 involved in a comprehensive plan decision. While interim designations need to err on
15 the side of over-inclusion, comprehensive plan designations and development regulations
16 for resource lands involve a wider range of discretion and balancing of competing
17 interests. The County's decision to set minimum lot sizes of 80 acres for some forest
18 land, 40 acres for other forest land and 20 acres for agriculture and agri-forest districts,
19 under the record presented here, was based upon appropriate information consideration
20 and involved a reasonable range of discretion allowable under the Act. Likewise, the
21 decision of Clark County to include golf courses as a conditional use in agriculture
22 districts was within the discretion afforded under the Act.

23 The County did concede during the hearings on the merits that CP policies 6.2.2 and
24 6.2.3 regarding public water extensions and required hookups in rural and resource areas
25 were internally inconsistent with policy 6.2.7 and with the CFPs which provided
26 generally that extension of water service to rural areas should be discouraged. In a

1 specific case challenging the water hookup provisions of the CP and DRs, the County
2 stipulated to a remand. If the internal inconsistency was not resolved by that remand, it
3 must be done by this one.
4

5 The 1980 Clark County Comprehensive Plan provided for "clustering" of residential
6 development on resource lands as long as approximately three-quarters of the land
7 remained for resource use. In adopting the Community Framework Plan, the County
8 adopted policy 3.2.7 to review that clustering concept "to ensure these developments
9 continued to conserve agriculture or forest land." That review was made and the County
10 determined that the goal of conserving resource lands was not being achieved by the
11 clustering concept. The record disclosed that the clustering concept as used in Clark
12 County over the last 15 years had had exactly the opposite effect. This continued loss of
13 resource land to clustering ended with the BOCC adopting an emergency moratorium
14 regarding cluster subdivisions on April 19, 1993. The moratorium was later renewed.

15 Petitioners claimed that the omission of a clustering option from the 1994 CP violated
16 Goal 6 of the Act. None of the petitioners showed any "property right" that was
17 violated by the County's decision, nor did they show that the BOCC acted in an
18 "arbitrary and discriminatory" manner. Ironically, one petitioner even claimed that the
19 remaining portion of a clustered property should not have been designated as a resource
20 land because of the proximity of residential development emanating from the cluster
21 options used under the old plan. Given the record in this case, we find that the County
22 is in compliance by eliminating the cluster development provisions and may well have
23 been out of compliance had those provisions been retained.
24
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26

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1 Buffers

2 RCW 36.70A.060 requires a county to adopt development regulations that “assure that
3 the use of *lands adjacent* to agricultural, forest, or mineral resource lands *shall not*
4 *interfere*” with the continued use of such agricultural, forest, or mineral lands (italics
5 added). This statutory provision forms the basis for a mandate to provide adequate
6 buffering between resource lands and incompatible uses. CFP policy 3.2.10 directs that
7 the County establish buffers for natural resource lands to “lessen potential impacts to
8 adjacent property” (italics supplied). Because this issue continues to surface in all cases
9 in our jurisdiction where resource lands are at issue, we take this opportunity to once
10 again state what this statute clearly directs.

11 The required development regulations are not intended to protect development from the
12 resource, but are to be designed to protect the resource from incompatible
13 encroachments. Clark County adopted “right to farm” and “right to log” ordinances,
14 and a vicinity resource activity plat notification ordinance. Clark County dealt with the
15 edge issues of resource lands and provided minimum lot sizes as an attempt to comply
16 with .060. Nonetheless, we find that Clark County has not complied with this
17 requirement to buffer resource lands from incompatible uses.

18 While plat notification and right to farm and log ordinances are essential first steps, their
19 objectives are often lost under the barrage of complaints from adjoining residential
20 neighbors. Dealing with edge issues on resource land designations furthers the
21 requirements of .060. Those steps by themselves are not sufficient to comply with the
22 mandate. Minimum lot sizes in rural designations do not fulfill the requirements of
23 .060. After remand Clark County must consider additional mechanisms to avoid the
24 single most destructive reason for elimination of resource lands; adjoining incompatible
25 land uses.

RURAL ISSUES

An understanding of Clark County's rural element can not be had without a review of the events that occurred over the 3 years preceding adoption of the CP. The unprecedented number of petitioners and intervenors in this case dramatically demonstrates an unusually high level of involvement in the GMA process. The actions of many citizens of Clark County over the 3-year period prior to adoption of the CP dramatically demonstrates an unmatched level of sophistication. The evidence of these actions is derived from a stipulation between Clark County and RCCPA, staff reports, the FSEIS, and other exhibits.

The sophisticated actions began shortly after the passage of the Growth Management Act and commencement of Clark County's planning process under it. In the decade of the 80's, cluster subdivision applications and resource lands segregations averaged approximately 6 per year. In 1990 and each year thereafter, the rate more than doubled to 13.3 per year. General subdivision applications in 1992 were the highest ever recorded and in 1993 increased an additional 27%. In May and June of 1992, approximately 40 new "rural" lots were created. In May and June of 1994, over 270 new lots were created. Overall in 1993, the planning department received an average of 135 permit applications per month, an increase of 17% from 1992.

Large lot subdivisions (between 5 and 20 acres) allowed as "segregations" by the previous comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance totaled 117 for the year 1989. In 1990, the number jumped to 789. In April of 1993, prior to adoption of an emergency moratorium there were applications for segregations of 407 parcels, an 800% increase from the previous month and more than the entire year of 1992. At the time of adoption of the emergency moratoria on clusters, subdivision planned unit developments, and

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1 large lot developments in April of 1993, an estimated 19 square miles of segregations
2 had occurred since May 1, 1990. Ultimately in November 1994, one month prior to
3 adoption of the CP, yet another emergency moratorium on all new developments less
4 than 20 acres had to be adopted by the BOCC. The segregations and subdivisions
5 applied for prior to the moratoria presumptively vested under current Washington law.

6
7 Within this backdrop the County adopted a rural designation and provided that *all* rural
8 lands would have a minimum lot size of 5 acres. The rural designation applied to
9 approximately 83,500 acres of Clark County's roughly 500,000 acre total. We find this
10 decision and minimum lot size, under the facts of this case, to be inconsistent with both
11 the GMA and the County's own policies as reflected in the CFPs and CP.

12 While rural lands may be the leftover meatloaf in the GMA refrigerator, they have very
13 necessary and important functions both as a planning mechanism and as applied on the
14 ground. One of the most important symbiotic relationships is the one between rural and
15 resource lands. Properly planned rural areas provide necessary support of and buffering
16 for resource lands. Early in the planning process, the Farm Focus Group established
17 what became known as the "rural resource line." South and west of this resource line,
18 the focus group, staff, and the Planning Commission recognized that segregations and
19 parcelizations had occurred involving thousands of lots ranging from 1 to 2.5 acres.
20 However, north of the "resource line", less parcelization had taken place. Much of the
21 prime resource areas were found in that location. The focus group concluded that south
22 of the line a 5 acre minimum lot size was appropriate for rural lands but that north of the
23 line a 10 acre minimum would further the CFP and CP policies of providing large
24 minimum lot sizes for residential development in rural areas to maintain the rural
25 character. (CFP 4.2.3)
26

1 The FSEIS stated that a 5/10 split for alternative B was not as good as the
2 "environmentally preferred" 10/15 acre split for alternative C. The planning department
3 recommended a 5/10 split while the Planning Commission was unable to agree. Some
4 members agreed with the planning department's recommendation while others favored a
5 uniform 10 acre minimum lot size throughout the County. The record contained
6 significant evidence concerning the relationship of minimum lot size to current resource
7 activity and the necessity for buffering. A major omission that the BOCC made in
8 establishing a 5-acre minimum lot size for all rural areas was ignoring the differences
9 that existed north and south of the "resource line".

10 A secondary aspect of a proper rural element planning involves the preservation of a
11 rural lifestyle. A "rurban sprawl" has the same devastating effects on proper land uses
12 and efficient use of tax payer dollars as urban sprawl. Uncoordinated development of
13 rural areas often involves greater economic burdens than in urban areas. Infrastructure
14 costs for rural development are, by definition, more inefficient than for urban.

15
16 The population projection issue is more thoroughly discussed in the urban section of this
17 Order. Nonetheless, it is important here to recognize that in its initial planning stages
18 the County allocated 15,000 of the population projection number for non-urban growth.
19 While the Act does not require a land capacity analysis for rural areas similar to that
20 necessary for UGAs, it does not allow existing and future conditions to be ignored.
21 There was ample evidence in this record to show that sufficient lots existed as of
22 December 1994 to accommodate the allocated 15,000 population increase in the rural
23 areas. The FSEIS stated that if all existing vacant parcels were developed with single
24 family residences over the next 20 years, the 15,000 population allocation would be
25 exceeded. An October 13, 1994 staff report based on tax lot information indicated there
26 was an excess of 13,500 preexisting undeveloped tax lots. At an average of 2.33

1 persons per household (used in the CP), there would be more than twice the number of
2 lots available to house the allocated 15,000 population projection, even without
3 additional divisions of land that would likely occur over the next 20 years. Clark
4 County asserted that it would be impossible for each lot or tax lot to develop, and with
5 that we agree. Nonetheless, the County candidly acknowledged that no different figures
6 were reviewed or analyzed other than those noted above.

7
8 The usefulness of population projections is destroyed if an arbitrary allocation number is
9 picked that has no basis in reality and which is not considered in relationship to the total
10 picture. Contrary to the assertion of CCCU, the population allocations for urban areas
11 plus the population allocations for non-urban areas must total the population projection.
12 Population projections and allocations are interdependent and are not solely for use in
13 urban areas. There are available lots which were presumably made for residential
14 purposes that far exceed the rural population allocation. A failure to recognize those
15 conditions necessarily skews the appropriate allocations for urban areas. Exacerbation
16 of this problem by placing only 5 acre minimum lot sizes for what unsegregated rural
17 areas remain in the County renders that determination not in compliance with the GMA.

18 CCCU and other petitioners contended that the 5 acre minimum lot size throughout the
19 County violated the GMA provision requiring a "variety of densities." Petitioners'
20 argument was that the BOCC must specifically provide a variety of densities at the time
21 of adopting the CP rather than allowing the variety to occur by "default." The Act does
22 not require a particular methodology for providing for a variety of densities. Given the
23 evidence in this case, more variety of densities has occurred in rural Clark County since
24 1990 than was ever envisioned in the Act. There has been no violation of the Act
25 regarding this issue.
26

1 Likewise, we do not find a violation of the public participation goals and requirements of
2 the Act simply because the decision on county-wide 5 acre rural lot size was made by the
3 BOCC near the end of their 5-day deliberative process. Many petitioners contended that
4 there was no specific consideration, study, or recommendation for such a county-wide 5
5 acre minimum prior to the BOCC decision. The record reveals that many different
6 suggestions and recommendations were made as to appropriate minimum lot sizes for
7 rural areas. The FSEIS alternative A involved a 2 1/2 minimum lot size. Much public
8 comment recommended 1 acre minimums. The mere fact that a different decision than
9 that recommended by staff, the Planning Commission, or the CAC was reached does not
10 *ipso facto* show a violation of public participation.

11 Rather, the flaw in the BOCC decision for a uniform 5 acre minimum lot size is shown
12 by reference to questions 3 and 4 of our four-question analysis. The BOCC did not give
13 appropriate consideration to the evidence contained in their own record concerning the
14 need for greater levels of buffering for resource lands, particularly north of the resource
15 line. They did not appropriately consider the impacts of the parcelizations and
16 segregations that had occurred since 1990. Regardless of fault, blame, or reasons why,
17 the extraordinary number of divisions in resource and rural lands allowed since 1991
18 lessened the reasonable range of discretion normally afforded to local decision makers
19 under the Act.

20 Before we began writing, we decided that each of the site-specific challenges would be
21 individually addressed in this Order. Many of the petitioners had expressed frustration
22 at the County process. They felt that their individual complaints and concerns were lost
23 in the morass of information and issues that accompanied the incredible scope of the
24 County's efforts. We empathized with those frustrations while understanding the need of
25 the County staff and elected officials to proceed the way they did.

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1 To facilitate our desire to respond to each individually, we reviewed the briefs,
2 arguments, evidence, and petitions of the site-specific claims. They involved a wide
3 range of complaints about designations as resource lands or rural lands, property right
4 violations, arbitrary and discriminatory action and public participation violations.

5
6 Once we reviewed these site-specific claims, we determined that logic dictated we first
7 decide and articulate our reasons for the generalized issues that were presented. When
8 we had completed that portion, we returned to the information regarding the site-specific
9 claims. As we rereviewed the site-specific information, we realized that all of the
10 answers to those claims were provided by the answers to the generalized issues. Taking
11 into account that this Final Order already neared 75 pages, we reevaluated the value of
12 adding 20 more pages to repeat the same conclusions already stated. In the end, the
13 drawbacks of adding 20 pages outweighed the benefit of demonstrating to each petitioner
14 that we thoroughly reviewed his/her case.

15 We understand the expressed frustration that many of the site-specific petitioners had
16 towards the predicament in which they found themselves. Those who did not take
17 advantage of the County's benign neglect between 1991 and 1994 now see their
18 neighbors allowed unencumbered rights to load the landscape with incompatible uses.
19 There are implementation measures the County could take to level this playing field and
20 reinject some fairness into the situation. Aggregation of the segregated lots, restrictions
21 on lots under 5 acres in the vicinity of resource lands, and other vehicles are available.
22 Whether the BOCC will adopt such measures remains to be seen. If they do not, the
23 unfair position that many of these site-specific petitioners find themselves in will be
24 perpetuated.
25
26

1 Urban Reserve

2 Under Clark County's Comprehensive Plan the concept of "urban reserve" involved a
3 designation for lands not classified as resource areas that were located on the fringe of
4 urban growth boundaries and thus available for possible future additions to urban growth
5 areas. The purpose of the urban reserve designation was to "protect the area from
6 premature land division and development that would preclude efficient transition to
7 urban development." The designation consisted of two components: "urban"
8 (residential) and "industrial". Urban reserve areas for the cities of Battle Ground,
9 Camas, La Center, Ridgefield, Washougal, and Vancouver involved 10 acre minimums
10 for residential urban reserves and 20 acre minimums for industrial urban reserves.
11 Actual acreage involved ranged from a low of 27 acres surrounding Camas to a high of
12 6,400 acres surrounding Vancouver.

13 Some petitioners complained that the concept violated the GMA. We do not agree.
14 Long range planning for a time-frame in excess of 20 years does not violate the GMA
15 and is a laudable planning achievement. We take official notice that other states with
16 longer histories of GMA planning than we, are experiencing problems with the
17 proliferation of 5 acre or less lots adjacent to urban growth boundaries when the time for
18 expansion of the UGA arrives. Contrary to some petitioners' assertions, GMA does not
19 require all planning to stop at the end of the 20 year period. We commend Clark County
20 for use of what appears to be an "innovative technique" for long range planning
21 purposes.

22 We do share some of petitioners' concerns about the application of the designations and
23 the lack of standards for future uses. The standards issues will be discussed later under
24 the urban section of this Order. The record is unclear as to whether any land that would
25 have otherwise been designated resource lands has been included in the urban reserve
26

1 area. If so, such inclusion would constitute a violation of the County's own policies as
2 well as the GMA.

3 4 CRITICAL AREAS

5 In an Order entered May 24, 1995, we declined petitioners' invitation to revisit our
6 decision in *Clark County I*. The County has acknowledged that it failed to comply with
7 the provisions of RCW 36.70A.060 (3) to review its wetland ordinance to assure
8 consistency with its comprehensive plan. As we noted in *North Cascades Audubon*
9 *Society v. Whatcom County (North Cascades)*, #94-2-0001, a critical area ordinance is
10 not "interim" since the Act does not require adoption of new designations and DRs in
11 the comprehensive plan process as is the case with resource lands. The statute does,
12 however, require a local government to review its critical area ordinance for
13 consistency, and this Clark County has not done. As this noncompliance is a procedural
14 one, once that review has taken place by the County, a person with standing who wishes
15 us to review that action as to its substance, must file a new petition.

16 As we noted in *Clark County I*, the wetlands ordinance constitutes only a portion of the
17 critical area protection requirements of the Act. Other areas that must be protected by
18 development regulations include areas with a critical recharging effect on aquifers used
19 for potable water, fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas, frequently flooded areas,
20 and geologically hazardous areas. At the time of our review of Clark County's wetlands
21 ordinance, these other areas had neither been designated nor protected.

22 Subsequent to September 1, 1991, Clark County did not take any action to adopt DRs as
23 required by RCW 36.70A.060. Rather, the County relied upon its existing regulations
24 as compliance. Reliance on pre-GMA designations and regulations without public
25
26

1 participation and new legislative action does not comply with the Act, *Friends of Skagit*
2 *County*.

3
4 Regardless of its failure to act during the time between September 1, 1991 and adoption
5 of its CP, Clark County did adopt Ordinance #94-12-53 as part of its development
6 regulations requirements. Section 28 of that ordinance is entitled "Existing Ordinances"
7 and is cited by Clark County as compliance with the critical area requirements of the
8 Act. The language of section 28 is often obscure. What is clear is that it does not rise
9 to the status of compliance with the Act.

10 While the most technical of notices of the impending adoption of these preexisting
11 ordinances was published, a review of this record disclosed that no adequate notice as
12 required by the Act was provided. There was never a hearing concerning critical areas
13 or implementing ordinances, nor was there any discussion by the BOCC. The only
14 reference in any part of the record about critical areas involved a question of one
15 Planning Commission member to the planning director about why the critical areas were
16 not being covered or discussed. The response from the planning director essentially said
17 that not enough time remained to completely deal with the topic. His answer, of course,
18 did not cover a reason for their omission since 1991.

19 While it is tempting to comment specifically on some of the substantive issues presented
20 by the pre-GMA ordinances, we will not. Since the County on at least 3 separate
21 occasions specifically requested us to "tell them what is necessary to adopt," we make
22 the following general observations. We are not unmindful of the irony of a local
23 government requesting precise and directive requirements. The County's position here
24 seems totally antithetical to both the protection of a local government's land use
25 authority and the direction of the GMA. The County candidly acknowledged that this
26

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1 request was based in part upon feared financial ramifications of Initiative 164. This
2 seems nothing more than the old political twist of trying to "put the turtle in another's
3 pocket." We will not accept this snapper. Suffice it to say that the GMA does not yet
4 have a provision for a local government to avoid its responsibilities because of fear of
5 Initiative 164.

6
7 We also note that section 114 of ESHB 1724 emphasizes the need for integrated planning
8 between GMA and SEPA. It would appear difficult for a local government to properly
9 integrate SEPA into GMA if the GMA process is ignored with sole reliance being placed
10 on pre-GMA SEPA ordinances.

11
12 AND NOW FOR SOMETHING COMPLETELY DIFFERENT

13
14 URBAN

15
16 (Nan Henriksen did not participate in hearing or deciding the urban portion of this
17 Order)

18
19 Population Projections

20 In its initial planning stages, Clark County adopted population projections that were a
21 conglomerate of Office of Financial Management (OFM) figures and projections issued
22 by Metro (Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas Planning Agency) and IRC (Clark
23 County Intergovernmental Resource Center). The figures were projected to the year
24 2010 and Clark County thereafter used a straight line interpolation to year 2012. These
25 figures exceeded the OFM projection, although the County contended that the difference
26 was only approximately 3,000 people. In August of 1994, the planning director issued a

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1 memorandum (Ex. 93) that stated the County was required to use the OFM figures under
2 recent Growth Management Board decisions. The County then decided to abandon use
3 of the conglomerate Metro projections and to strictly use the OFM 2012 projections. As
4 so often happens, the plan was good but the execution was lacking. During the hearing
5 on the merits, the County conceded that the original Metro population projections
6 continued to be used through the CP process.

7
8 We held in *Port Townsend*, that the OFM projections must be used unless convincing
9 evidence for a different figure was presented. In this case, Clark County did not even
10 attempt to present evidence that the Metro figures should have been used because the
11 County decided to use the OFM projections. Unquestionably, if the OFM projections
12 are the proper ones then those exact figures must be used. The County's failure to do so
13 results in noncompliance with the GMA.

14 The County and many intervenors contended that the difference of 3,000 people over a
15 20-year period was *de minimis* and should not require a remand. The first answer to that
16 contention is that the record is not at all clear that only a 3,000 population projection
17 difference resulted. Remand is also required because there are other instances of
18 noncompliance within the UGA and population projection panorama. As noted earlier in
19 this Order, the arbitrary assignment of 15,000 additional population to the rural areas
20 was not based on sustainable evidence. The record showed that even if Clark County
21 imposed a 20-year moratorium on division in rural areas for residential purposes, there
22 would still be significantly more than a 15,000 person influx into the rural area. The
23 County must analyze the reality of the preexisting lot sizes in some manner and correlate
24 that reality with OFM population projections.
25
26

1 As pointed out by CCNRC, the County had a planning expiration date of 2012 when it
2 adopted its CP in December 1994. When readjusting the projection in August 1994, the
3 County failed to take into account the 3-year population influx since 1991. This had the
4 effect of implanting projections that were not based on OFM numbers, for a 20-year
5 population into a 17-year plan. This action does not comply with the GMA.

6
7 In order to comply with the GMA the County must (1) use the OFM 2012 projection,
8 (2) deduct from that number the population increase in the County since 1991 and (3)
9 make an allocation of projected rural growth that is reasoned and reasonable considering
10 existing conditions. The remaining number must then be allocated to the various cities
11 and towns before urban growth boundaries are determined. We are aware of recent
12 legislation, ESB 5876, that allows the County to use a projection within a range rather
13 than an exact number. This would perhaps affect step 1 but does not have any
14 relationship to steps 2 and 3.

15 Lest there be any question about the scope of our ruling as to Clark County's UGA
16 decisions, the necessity for this remand is a result of two factors. The first is Clark
17 County's nonuse of the correct OFM population projections. Were it not for that
18 noncompliance, we would not be requiring reallocation of steps 2 and 3 above. In *Port*
19 *Townsend*, we recommended challenging OFM projections by petition rather than ending
20 up as Clark County has here.

21 We are also concerned about the impact of changing the 15,000 rural allocation figure.
22 It is not our intention to promote sprawl and somehow "reward" the County for its
23 allowance of these parcelizations and segregations during the 3 year planning process. It
24 is our intention to not have the sprawl problem exacerbated by the addition of overly
25
26

1 large UGAs. Our decision here reflects some very unusual circumstances presented by
2 this record.

3
4 Because the proper defining of an UGA involves more than just population projections,
5 we address the remaining issues raised in this case to facilitate the County's ultimate
6 decision after remand.

7
8 Vacant Lands Analysis

9 Many petitioners challenged the Vacant Lands Analysis (VLA) prepared by Clark
10 County and used as one of the bases to determine the proper UGAs. The attacks
11 centered not on the methodology of the VLA but rather upon the assumptions that went
12 into it. After reviewing this record and listening to hours of argument, it is clear to us
13 that the assumptions used by Clark County, with the exception of the market factor
14 discussed in the next paragraph, were all well within the range of discretion afforded to
15 the local decision maker under the Act. We reaffirm our oft-stated precept that our
16 review is not to determine whether a better planning strategy exists but rather to
17 determine whether the goals and requirements of the GMA have been achieved.

18 In the assumption phase of the VLA the County used a market factor of 25% for
19 residential areas and 50% for commercial and industrial areas. This market factor was
20 applied to land to ensure a viable continuing market that would not be artificially inflated
21 by an overly restrictive land base. The use of a market factor was generally consistent
22 with DCTED guidelines in place at the time of the adoption of the CP. Those
23 guidelines, however, recommend only a 25% increase for industrial and commercial
24 areas.
25
26

1 The other two Boards have had occasion to rule on the issue of the use of a market factor
2 and have held that the GMA authorizes such a consideration. We take this opportunity,
3 our first, to agree with those decisions. In any event, all questions about the use of a
4 market factor were clarified by EHB 1305. The problem that arises in this case is not
5 the use of a market factor but rather its use in conjunction with the establishment of
6 urban reserve areas and the lack of standards for implementation.

7
8 As noted earlier, the noncompliance in Clark County's use of urban reserve areas is
9 because of a lack of criteria for conversion of the urban reserve area to urban growth
10 area. In conjunction with that flaw, the use of a 25 or 50% market factor in setting the
11 initial UGA in effect "double-dips" the land area under consideration. In its CP the
12 County established an annual review of the factors used to establish the urban growth
13 boundary. The purpose of this annual review was to determine whether the location of
14 the boundary "is working" or whether it needed to be expanded or contracted. The
15 effect is to have a fluid UGA with inadequate infill provisions that does not achieve the
16 anti-sprawl cornerstone of the Act.

17 While an urban growth boundary does not have to be cast in concrete, it must have
18 liberal applications of superglue. The County must make a choice on remand between
19 the use of a market factor in the vacant lands analysis and the use of urban reserve areas.
20 The County's concept of incremental movement of the urban growth boundary to always
21 have a 20-year planning horizon is not in compliance with the GMA.

22 To a large extent, the reason for that noncompliance is because of the lack of standards
23 for moving the boundary into the URA and the lack of strong DRs from the County
24 and/or the affected city to implement tiering and infill. These omissions distinguish this
25 case from *Reading*.

1 Urban Holdings/Contingency Zoning

2
3 As part of its concurrency requirement, Clark County adopted policies in its
4 comprehensive plan for "urban holding districts" and "contingent zoning" provisions.

5 At page 12.4 of the CP, these concepts were explained as follows:

6 "The comprehensive plan map contemplates two land use methods to
7 assure the adequacy of public facilities needed to support urban
8 development within urban growth areas (1) Contingent Zoning which
9 applies an "X" suffix with the urban zone and (2) applying an Urban
Holding District combined with urban zoning."

10 The stated goal of these two concepts was to prohibit urban growth within the urban
11 growth area until sufficient infrastructure was in place or assured, or until annexation
12 took place. Clark County used these two concepts within the UGA to support the
13 concurrency goals and requirements of the Act and to provide a mechanism for tiering of
14 urban growth.

15 Petitioner CCNRC contended that the urban holding district was invalid because the Act
16 prohibits allowing an area to be included in the UGB that is not able to be served with
17 public facilities and services in the 20-year planning period. Secondly, CCNRC pointed
18 out, annexation of these urban holding areas would not necessarily resolve the problem
19 of lack of concurrent public facilities and services. Petitioner Holsinger contended that
20 the contingent zoning area was applied in an "arbitrary and discriminatory" manner to
21 the 179th Street/I-5 area where his property is located.

22 The urban holding residential areas have minimum lot sizes of 1 du/10 acres. Industrial
23 urban holding zones have a minimum lot sizes of 1 du/20 acres. Unlike the urban
24 reserve areas, which are located outside the UGA, the urban holding areas are
25 definitionally located within the boundary. Each holding area is identified in the CP at
26

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1 page 12.5 and 6 for each individual city. Each area is required to maintain the
2 "holding" designation until the city can assure adequate provisions are in place or will
3 be made if the area is to be annexed. While we are unsure of how the County could
4 enforce such a requirement if annexation did occur, we do not find a violation of the
5 GMA on the basis of that possibility alone. The concept of the urban holding area
6 within an urban growth area furthers the concurrency goals and requirements of the Act.
7 The use of such a concept is in the discretion afforded to local decision makers.

8
9 It is accurate to say that the CP provides for contingent zoning restrictions only in the
10 179th Street/I-5 area as petitioner Holsinger claims. It is also true that that area provides
11 the most significant reason for the adoption of the contingent zoning concept. In order
12 to show a violation of Goal 6, a petitioner must first show that a "right" of a landowner
13 has been violated. This has not been done by Holsinger. We do not perceive that there
14 exists a recognizable "right" to develop property for the maximum profit regardless of
15 the short-term and/or long-term impact to the taxpayer. Nor has petitioner shown that
16 even if such a "right" existed that the mere fact this area is the only one burdened by the
17 contingent zone concept is in and of itself an arbitrary and discriminatory decision. The
18 record is clear that the area in question, of which petitioner owns but a small portion,
19 has significant inadequacies in public facilities. The correction of these deficiencies
20 prior to further urbanization follows exactly what GMA requires. We find no violation.

21 Industrial Designations

22 As an integral part of the economic development element of its CP, Clark County relied
23 heavily on background work done by the Technical Advisory Committee and by
24 Columbia River Economic Development Council (CREDC). Working together, those
25 groups developed a report dated March 12, 1993 (Ex. 613) which included an extensive
26 parcel-by-parcel industrial land survey. Recognizing the regional nature of economic

1 development, the groups surveyed both county and city industrial land areas. The report
2 concluded that approximately 12,000 acres were designated or zoned industrial land
3 throughout the county. Some 4,800 acres were currently in use. Only 1,200 acres of
4 the vacant industrial land were determined to be "prime". The remaining 6,000 acres
5 were categorized as marginal or poor. The 3 categories of prime, marginal or poor were
6 chosen after reviewing the "key factors" of parcel size, sensitive lands and utilities.
7 Adjoining land use was also taken into account in the categorization process.

8
9 To answer the question of the amount of industrial land needed over the planning cycle,
10 the report looked at 3 separate methodologies. The first was a forecast based upon
11 historical industrial land absorption of 100 acres per year. The resulting figure of 2,000
12 (although only a 17-year planning cycle was used by the County) was then multiplied by
13 a 50% market factor. A projected need for 3,000 acres of *prime* industrial land was thus
14 determined.

15 The second methodology involved a cooperative inventory with the Washington State
16 Department of Employment Security to estimate industrial land densities. Determining
17 that an average employee per acre ratio of 8 existed, the needed acreage was estimated to
18 be 1,739. Again, a 50% market factor was added to reach a total of 2,609, which was
19 then converted in the report "with a slight cushion" to be 3,000 acres.

20 The final methodology involved a 1984 study conducted by the Stanford Research
21 Institute (SRI) for the Portland metropolitan area. That 1984 report indicated that 3,000
22 acres of industrial land were necessary for an adequate 20-year supply. The SRI report
23 apparently did not segregate "prime" from other industrial lands.

1 Based upon these methodologies, the report recommended that the CP include a prime
2 industrial land base of 3,000 acres. Clark County and the cities agreed. The report did
3 not recommend any increase to, or even retention of, the 6,000 acres that had been
4 categorized as marginal or poor.

5
6 The "3,000 prime acres" became engulfed by exuberance and seemed to take on a
7 "mystical" quality. It is commendable, laudable, and important for a county and its
8 cities to designate sufficient areas to facilitate economic growth. The workings of
9 CREDC and the Land Use Committee in determining the appropriate level of those goals
10 were thorough. There are however, two matters that require remand and re-
11 examination.

12 The most obvious flaw in the CP designations involves the change in the rallying cry for
13 "3,000 acres" to the policy of "3,000 *new* acres." The existing 1,200 acres of prime
14 industrial land somehow was forgotten. In the context of the exhaustive planning
15 process undertaken by Clark County it is easy to understand how that occurred.

16
17 The less obvious flaws involve the methodology used to arrive at the 3,000 acres. Clark
18 County adopted industrial urban reserve areas outside UGAs. These URAs were not
19 invested with any standards for the timing of, or criteria for, conversion from outside to
20 within an urban growth area. These URAs were designated in addition to the 50%
21 market factor used to estimate need. The historical forecast programmed for 20 years
22 rather than the 17 years of the CP, and then used a straight 50% addition for projected
23 need. The density requirement methodology not only contained a 50% market factor,
24 but also projected an additional 15% cushion. The third methodology, the 1984 SRI
25 study, did not provide any supporting rationale or even segregated "prime" from other
26 classifications.

1 The record before us is cloudy as to exactly the amount of industrial land classified by
2 the County and the cities and how much of it was "prime." The amount of acreage in
3 the industrial urban reserve area is unknown. Exhibit 2, a list of various acreages for
4 the urban growth areas, designates "light" and "heavy" industrial acreages. These
5 designations are not of assistance in reviewing the amount of "prime" acreage. We were
6 unable to find any corresponding chart for the URA acreage. On remand, the figures
7 used and the results must be more clearly set forth and must be within the limits
8 provided by the Act as set forth in the preceding 2 paragraphs.

9
10 A second stated purpose for industrial URA was to provide large acreage areas outside
11 the UGA for potential "emergency" use if a significant employer became available and
12 public facilities and services issues could be resolved. This strategy was designed to
13 keep small scale industrial and commercial uses out of the areas and preserve them for
14 major industrial capabilities. If a user did appear on the scene, the URAs could be
15 converted into the urban growth area at a later time after resolution of concurrency
16 issues. Again, it is unclear from this record whether these large scale URAs were
17 considered part of the "prime" 3,000-acre industrial areas.

18 Whatever question may have been involved at the time of adoption of these industrial
19 URAs concerning the necessity for siting them within an urban growth area has been
20 resolved by recent amendments found in ESB 5019. The 1995 Legislature has clearly
21 directed that industrial growth outside of urban areas can occur under specified criteria.
22 In conjunction with the reanalysis of the industrial land siting issues noted above, the
23 County must reconsider the viability of industrial URAs in light of ESB 5019. If the
24 URA designations are to continue, the criteria for their conversion must coincide with
25 those set forth in the legislation. One of the standards that should be strongly considered
26 is a prohibition of conversion of "prime" industrial designation to any other use.

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1 Additional urban issues were raised with regard to the proper designation of the UGA by
2 Clark County, as well as challenges to the comprehensive plans and development
3 regulations of individual cities. We will address those issues by means of identification
4 of the city involved with the issues involving them and their urban growth areas.
5

6 Vancouver

7 We initially note that Vancouver asserted there were some 5,562 acres of vacant,
8 industrially-designated land in its urban area. Of that amount, only 530 acres have been
9 identified as "prime." The remaining 5,000 were designated as either secondary
10 (marginal) or tertiary (virtually useless) (VLA Ex. 161). Prior to the County
11 establishing an appropriate UGA, the City of Vancouver must determine what uses are to
12 be made of these 5,000 acres that are concededly no longer useful as industrial lands.

13 Another major determination that has not been resolved by this record is the impact of
14 the Vancouver Transit Overlay Ordinance. During the early stages of this case, the
15 challenge to that ordinance was stipulated by Vancouver and Clark County to require a
16 remand. Most of Vancouver's infill policies and implementation measures revolve
17 around the success of high density transit corridors, which in turn are primarily
18 dependent upon an effective transit overlay ordinance. Since that ordinance, and its
19 accompanying high density aspects, is not presently before us, we have no alternative
20 but to find the remaining infill and density portions of Vancouver's CP inadequate and
21 not in compliance with the Growth Management Act. The City has conceded that other
22 implementation measures to fulfill density and infill requirements under the CFP and
23 GMA were in process but had not been adopted at the time of these appeals. The
24 successful completion of those ordinances will be necessary to show compliance.
25
26

1 Vancouver adopted a "sensitive lands ordinance" in 1992 pursuant to the requirements of
2 GMA relating to critical areas. Unlike Clark County, the City of Vancouver has had
3 development regulations in place since 1992 relating to critical areas protection. We
4 have no authority at this late date to review petitioners' challenges to the substance of
5 those ordinances, *North Cascades*. The City conceded that it did not complete the
6 consistency review required by RCW 36.70A.060(3). In this regard, the City of
7 Vancouver, like Clark County, is not in compliance with the goals and requirements of
8 the Act. This review must be completed in order for the City to achieve compliance.
9 Any changes made from that review or any challenges concerning the consistency of the
10 ordinance with Vancouver's CP would be the subject for a new petition after the review
11 has been completed.

12 Petitioners, particularly CENRC, raised other challenges to the Vancouver CP. The
13 initial challenge involved a failure of Vancouver to include the 10-year traffic forecast
14 required by RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b)(iv). Submission of the information to CTED does
15 not comply with the statute. It must be included in the comprehensive plan. *Reading*.
16 The CP is not in compliance with the GMA in this respect.

17 The Capital Facilities Plan adopted by Vancouver, its concurrency system with
18 established levels of service (LOS) and financial projections were all challenged. In all
19 those challenges petitioners failed to meet their burden of proof of showing
20 noncompliance.

21
22 The City established LOS standards for many public services including transportation
23 and parks. The Act requires that these LOS standards be established but invests local
24 governments with wide discretion as to their level. Petitioners have not shown that the
25 Act was violated simply because a national park study LOS standard was not adopted or
26

1 because the LOS standard for roads in some instances was established at a "failing"
2 level. Vancouver has established concurrency requirements for transportation and other
3 public facilities and services. Petitioners have not shown that these requirements are
4 inadequate to the point of noncompliance with the Act.

5
6 Petitioners challenged the funding aspects of Vancouver's Capital Facilities Plan.
7 Again, petitioners failed to show a violation of the Act. Local decision makers are
8 directed to review potential revenue avenues, determine if projected funding will meet
9 the needs set forth in the Capital Facilities Plan, and prioritize those projects to serve
10 areas where growth is to be channeled. Vancouver has done this, albeit with more
11 optimism than petitioners believe is likely. The decisions shown in this record are well
12 within the discretion afforded by the Act. Vancouver has also complied with the Act by
13 providing for alternative actions if revenues fall below projected levels.

14 Within the UGA of Vancouver petitioner Wade's property was designated as light
15 industrial. Petitioner did not demonstrate that a violation of the GMA occurred simply
16 because the County chose to limit further commercial expansion in the vicinity of that
17 property. Nonetheless, the petition is remanded for further consideration in light of our
18 finding that all the industrial area designations need to be reevaluated.

19 Camas

20 Clark County's CFP, adopted in conjunction with each city in accordance with RCW
21 36.70A.210, provided that urban density must average between 6 and 10 du/acre.

22 Camas contended that it objected and continued to object to the imposition of this CFP
23 policy. Under the provisions of RCW 36.70A.210(6), the time for challenge to that
24 policy has long since past. Camas also adopted a 75% single family to 25% multi-
25 family ratio in contravention of the CFP.

1 The FSEIS, Camas CP, and an acknowledgment by Camas at the hearing on the merits
2 demonstrate that even at a minimum of 6 du/acre, under any conceivable rational
3 population allocation, Camas would not have to expand its municipal boundaries for the
4 next 20 years. Thus, there can be no justification for an UGA beyond the Camas
5 municipal boundaries. There is no need for residential urban reserve areas surrounding
6 Camas under the record that exists here.

7
8 Petitioners also challenged the critical area DRs adopted by Camas. We do not have
9 authority to review the substantive portions of these regulations because they were
10 adopted in August 1991. Our role at this stage is to determine whether such DRs are
11 consistent with the CP.

12 Camas pointed out that its CP contains numerous references to critical area regulations
13 "that facially demonstrate that the comprehensive plan was drafted in consideration of
14 and to be consistent with the existing development regulations." This facial
15 demonstration, however, does not comply with the requirement to review these DRs to
16 achieve consistency with the CP. Local decision makers must be aware of the critical
17 area DRs, the provisions of the CP and must allow an opportunity for the public to
18 comment upon, and be involved in, the review process. There was no such action that
19 took place here. The issue is remanded for procedural compliance. Any dissatisfaction
20 with the result of that compliance would be the subject for a new petition.

21 As with Clark County and Vancouver, petitioners challenged the capital facilities plan,
22 LOS standards and concurrency aspects of Camas' CP and DRs. Petitioners have failed
23 to meet their burden of proof.
24
25
26

1 The challenges of petitioners to the public services and facilities aspects of the Camas CP
2 appeared to be almost an afterthought to the Clark County and Vancouver challenges.
3 Our review of the record shows that Camas developed a number of background studies
4 and plans for its capital projects for parks, water, sewer, streets, transportation, etc.
5 LOS standards were adopted for transportation and, in addition, for parks, open space,
6 police, fire, wastewater, and drinking water. Proposed expenditures were based upon
7 these incorporated plans and studies. Major sources of funding were identified and an
8 annual review process was instituted to make adjustments for changes in financial
9 projections. Local governments have a wide range of discretion under the Act in
10 developing funding sources and projections. The Act does require contingency plans if
11 funding sources are later found insufficient. Camas has complied with the Act in these
12 regards.

13 In reviewing Petitioners' challenges to water issues, this record showed that Camas met
14 most of the goals and requirements of the Act. A 1994 Water System Plan update was
15 made. It included an inventory of existing facilities and a projection of future needs and
16 proposed improvements to the waste water system. Camas conceded, however, that its
17 land use element did not comply with the stormwater drainage aspects of RCW
18 36.70A.070(1) that provides in part:

19 " . . . [W]here applicable, the land use element shall review drainage,
20 flooding, and storm water run-off in the area and nearby jurisdictions and
21 provide guidance for corrective actions to mitigate or cleanse those
22 discharges that pollute the waters of the state, including Puget Sound or
23 waters entering Puget Sound."

24 This matter is remanded to Camas for compliance.
25
26

1 Two additional petitions challenged the actions of Clark County regarding the Camas
2 UGA. In the first, *North Lackamas, et. al.*, contended that their property was
3 incorrectly designated as agricultural, forest or agri-forest and that SEPA provisions
4 were violated. Those issues were answered in the resource lands portion of this Order.
5 The petition also contended that the property was incorrectly left out of the Camas UGA.
6 The necessity for the Camas UGA to be located at municipal limits shown above makes
7 further consideration of that claim unnecessary. We note, however, that the fact that
8 water and sewer services are or could be made available does not direct that an area
9 must be included in an UGA. Availability of public facilities does not in and of itself
10 define an area as "characterized by urban growth." We have consistently held that
11 public facility availability cannot be the sole criterion for inclusion within an UGA.
12 *Reading.*

13 The other petition was brought by Sun Country Homes, Inc. and alleged that its property
14 within the Camas UGA was incorrectly designated by the BOCC as light industrial.
15 Many of the arguments concerning the inappropriateness of an industrial designation to
16 this property dovetail with and provide support for our decision to require reevaluation
17 of all industrial designations. The property does not appear to be consistent with the CP
18 emphasis on "prime" industrial land. Because of the necessity to establish the Camas
19 UGA at the municipal limits and because petitioner's property is located between the
20 Vancouver and Camas UGA, the County must assign a designation that more properly
21 fulfills the goals and requirements of the GMA. That designation must include a
22 recognition of the impact on the Fisher Quarry mining site located nearby.

23 Washougal

24 Various petitioners challenged the Washougal UGA on the grounds previously set forth
25 in the Clark County UGA portion of this Order. Additionally, Friends of the Gorge
26

1 challenged the decision by Clark County to place a portion of the UGA within the
2 Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area. The rational for the BOCC action was to
3 "support" the efforts of Washougal to have the area eliminated from coverage under
4 federal law. By dispositive motion we dismissed the claim of Friends of the Gorge that
5 the action of the BOCC violated the federal statute. We held that we had no authority to
6 rule on such a claim.

7
8 However, we did review this matter as part of the hearings on the merits because of the
9 alleged violation of GMA. Under the situation shown by this record, we find that GMA
10 has been violated and that there is no basis for the BOCC to place part of an urban
11 growth area within the confines of the National Scenic Area. The Gorge Commission
12 has the authority to establish densities at that location. One residence for every 2 acres
13 is the maximum allowed. Obviously 1 du/2 acres is not an urban density. Until that
14 density is changed, the GMA does not allow Clark County to impose an urban growth
15 area there since it is not, nor could it be, urban.

16 Battle Ground

17 Much of petitioners' challenges to the Battle Ground CP involved the designation of the
18 UGA. Clark County must reevaluate and reestablish the UGAs for all cities and towns,
19 with the exception of Yacolt, and size them appropriately. This record is clear that the
20 area established for Battle Ground is too large, particularly in light of Battle Ground's
21 failure to comply with the community framework plan and the GMA.

22 Battle Ground acknowledged that it does not have any "infill" policies, but instead relied
23 upon "concurrency" policies for appropriate phasing of its urban growth. The
24 assumption made by Battle Ground was that until public facilities and services were
25 available on a cost-efficient basis, the market place would necessarily preclude inefficient
26

1 sprawl. The invalidity of this assumption is shown by many examples, both within
2 Clark County and throughout the State of Washington. Much of the need for the Growth
3 Management Act was a result of prior reliance on this assumption.
4

5 Concurrency is not the same as infill. Both have separate and distinct purposes. Infill
6 relates to the phasing of growth. Its primary purpose is to avoid the inefficient use of
7 the land resource, i.e., sprawl. Concurrency is intended to ensure that at the time of
8 new development, public facilities and services are in place or are adequately planned.
9 Its primary purpose is to avoid the predicament of development after development
10 decreasing levels of service to complete failure with no funding relief in sight.

11 Ultimately, the failure occasioned by added development becomes a burden on the public
12 taxpayer of the city or county involved.

13 The lack of appropriate infill policies and DRs is exacerbated by the City's failure to
14 adhere to the CFP ratio of 60% single family to 40% multi-family in order to provide
15 appropriate densities for urban development. Battle Ground adopted a 75/25 ratio in its
16 CP, which is a violation of the CFP and therefore of the GMA.

17
18 One purpose of the 60/40 ratio is to achieve affordable housing goals. Battle Ground did
19 not adopt any adequate policies, nor implementing development regulations for
20 affordable housing. In order to achieve compliance, Battle Ground must adopt a 60/40
21 ratio and implement policies and DRs for infill and affordable housing.

22 Petitioners also contended that Battle Ground failed to review and/or adopt adequate
23 drainage, flooding, and stormwater strategies and policies as required by RCW
24 36.70A.070(1). Battle Ground accurately pointed out that existing facilities were noted
25 in its Capital Facilities Plan and CP. However, there was a failure by Battle Ground to
26

1 adopt drainage and stormwater goals, policies, strategies, and regulations. Merely
2 listing existing facilities and stopping there does not fulfill the mandate of RCW
3 36.70A.070 (1).
4

5 Petitioners further contended that Battle Ground failed to provide groundwater protection
6 because its wetland ordinance exempts class II wetlands from coverage. Other than
7 making conclusory statements, petitioners did not carry their burden of proving that this
8 exemption amounted to a failure to protect groundwater supply.

9
10 Petitioner Barner complained that the designation of her property adjoining the UGA of
11 Battle Ground to a 5-acre minimum violated the GMA. Her complaint alleged a
12 violation of RCW 36.70A.110 requiring urban growth to be located in areas
13 characterized by urban growth which also have existing public facility and service
14 capabilities. She contended that her property provided a natural physical boundary to the
15 ultimately decided UGA of Battle Ground and that the existing road systems serving her
16 property were "sufficient for development under 1-acre zoning" thus satisfying the goals
17 of minimizing infrastructure costs.

18 This record provides ample support for the County decision to exclude this property
19 from the Battle Ground UGA. While an area cannot be included in an UGA unless it is,
20 or is adjacent to, an area characterized by urban growth, the reverse is not necessarily
21 so. Existing urbanization does not always dictate UGA inclusion. In light of our earlier
22 discussion concerning the reduction of the Battle Ground UGA, there is no reason to
23 remand this case for further consideration.
24
25
26

1 Ridgefield

2 As with the cities of Camas and Battle Ground, the CP for Ridgefield adopted a 75/25
3 ratio for single-family to multi-family designations. Ridgefield is not in compliance with
4 the Act unless and until it adopts the 60/40 ratio and implements the same with
5 appropriate DRs.

6
7 Because Ridgefield's UGA must be reevaluated, we will review the industrial lands
8 decisions in order to provide guidance for the re-examination.

9
10 The Ridgefield city limits are located some 3 miles west of the 179th street junction with
11 I-5. Known to all as the "junction," this undeveloped, agriculturally-based area was
12 seen as the last virgin industrial territory available within 30 minutes of the Portland
13 metropolitan area. In the 1980's, the Port of Ridgefield acquired and improved acreage
14 at the junction for industrial purposes. As an accommodation for this industrial growth,
15 the City assisted in obtaining funding to build a pressurized sewer line from the junction
16 to the City's sewage treatment plant. This pressurized line was dedicated for industrial
17 purposes only and was not to be used for any residential growth along its length.

18 Currently the area around the junction has a low residential occupancy, small
19 commercial and industrial uses and, like Alex Rodriguez, vast potential as yet
20 unrealized. Recognizing this potential and the need for higher wages than those
21 provided by service industries, Clark County and Ridgefield determined that the area
22 around Ridgefield should be planned as a regional employment center. The UGA for
23 Ridgefield was established with this regional employment center concept as the
24 forerunner.

25 The County was confronted with two difficulties under the GMA in achieving its
26 purpose of tying Ridgefield and the junction together. The first involved provisions of

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1 RCW 36.70A.110(3) that urban government services are to be provided by cities and are
2 not to be provided in rural areas. The second was the prohibition of siting urban uses,
3 such as industrial designations, outside of urban growth areas. In order to resolve these
4 conflicts and ultimately allow the building of a gravity flow sewer and water system to
5 the junction area from the City, the County established a circular "bell" around the City
6 and a smaller "bell" augmented with urban reserve areas around the junction. The two
7 "bells" were then connected by a wide "bar". In order to accomplish this
8 gerrymandered UGA, the County committed thousands of acres of land that would have
9 otherwise been designated as resource lands (Ex. 77).

10 While the regional employer concept is laudable and achievable, particularly under
11 recent amendments to the GMA, the methodology chosen by the County is not in
12 compliance with the Act. The use of 3 miles of resource lands to connect the "bells"
13 and provide a topographical feature for a later to be installed gravity flow sewer and
14 water system does not comply with the Act under the record shown here. As noted by
15 both the City and the County, the area around the junction is not and never will be an
16 urbanized residential area. The only urbanization involves the hope that some day a
17 major employer will view the site as "econotopia".

18 On remand the County will want to consider the use of amendments found in ESB 5019
19 (Ch. 190, Laws of 1995) and the amendment to RCW 36.70A.110(4) implemented by
20 EHB 1305 (Ch. 400, Laws of 1995) to accomplish its goals for the Ridgefield area while
21 still achieving compliance with the Act. If the County decides to retain the industrial
22 urban reserve area designation, it too could provide a vehicle to achieve the regional
23 employment center goal. The County might also consider an expanded presence by the
24 Port of Ridgefield. The record here does not contain information on the relationship of
25 the Port to the junction area and the use that that relationship could be put to.
26

1 LaCenter

2 Petitioner Beck alleged that his property should have been included in the LaCenter
3 UGA as being adjacent to urban growth. The property has been designated agricultural
4 since 1980 and is so designated in the current CP. It is under agricultural current use
5 tax deferral status and does not have any current urbanization. The same situation exists
6 as to the Woverton petition, except the prior zoning was rural estates and the 1994 CP
7 designated the property agri-forest. It too is in the current use tax deferral program as
8 agricultural property. The petitioners in those two cases have not carried their burden of
9 proof of showing a violation of the GMA by exclusion of their property from the
10 LaCenter UGA. There is no need to remand that decision to the BOCC even though re-
11 examination of LaCenter's UGA is necessary.

12
13 ISSUES FOR WHICH WE COULD
14 NOT FIND A CONVENIENT CATEGORY
15

16
17 Open Space Corridor

18 Given that the UGA of Camas must be maintained at the municipal boundaries in order
19 to comply with the Act and that re-examination of Vancouver's UGA is in order,
20 petitioners' contention that RCW 36.70A.160 required an open-space corridor between
21 the two UGAs is not strictly an issue for resolution. However, it is clear from the
22 language of the statute that such an "open-space corridor" need only be identified
23 "within and between urban growth areas." The statute adds that such identification
24 cannot be used to designate the area as agriculture or forest for the sole purpose of
25 maintaining the land as a corridor unless a local government purchases development
26 rights.

1 The land between Vancouver and Camas includes an area called Fishers Swale, which
2 should be reviewed by the County as it adopts a critical areas ordinance to determine
3 consistency with its CFPs and with RCW 36.70A.160.
4

5 LOS Standards

6 Many petitioners challenged the traffic and road LOS decisions of the County. The
7 record reveals that the County reviewed and analyzed the various options available in
8 establishing these LOS standards. There is wide discretion afforded to a local
9 government in establishing LOS standards. There was no violation of the GMA, shown
10 by this challenge.

11 The transportation element of the CP does not include a traffic forecast as required by
12 RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b)(iv). Clark County argued that the information was contained in
13 various other documents. The Act requires that it be contained in the CP. Referencing
14 other documents is not in compliance with the GMA. *Reading.*
15

16 Water, Sewer and Storm Water

17 As part of its CP, Clark County adopted "direct" concurrency requirements for a
18 number of public services including water. At p. 6-4, the CP provided that:

19 "...While the *GMA* requires direct concurrency only for transportation
20 facilities, this plan extends the concept of direct concurrency to cover
21 other critical public facilities of water, sanitary sewer and storm
22 drainage."

23 While Clark County has been involved in a significant study of its water issues through
24 its water plan (Ex. 912), it has failed to adopt any of the strategies contained in the plan
25 for implementation measures. Having adopted a "direct" concurrency requirement
26 through its CP, the GMA requires that implementing DRs be imposed that prohibit new

1 development from reducing established levels of service. Clark County has not done this
2 and thus is not in compliance with the Act.

3
4 Clark County also contended that since it owns no sanitary sewer or water systems, it
5 was not required to comply with RCW 36.70A.070(3) which requires a CP to include a
6 capital facilities plan element that consists of:

- 7 “(a) An inventory existing capital facilities *owned by public entities*, showing the
8 locations and capacities of the capital facilities (italics added);
9 (b) a forecast of the future needs for such capital facilities;
10 (c) the proposed locations and capacities of expanded or new capital facilities;
11 (d) at least a six-year plan that will finance such capital facilities within projected
12 funding capacities and clearly identifies sources of public money for such
13 purposes; and
14 (e) a requirement to reassess the land-use element if probable funding falls short of
15 meeting existing needs and to ensure that the land use element, capital facilities
16 plan element, and financing plan within the capital facilities plan element are
17 coordinated and consistent.”

18 The language of that statute involves facilities owned by “public entities” and does not
19 limit capital facilities planning to only those facilities owned by the County. Public
20 facilities that are owned by cities and are covered in a different comprehensive plan do
21 not need reiteration in a County’s plan. Other facilities owned by “public entities” do
22 need to be included in order to adequately assess and fulfill the requirements of RCW
23 36.70A.070(3). Clark County’s failure to take this action was a violation of GMA.

24 Clark County further argued that if such a requirement existed it would merely
25 incorporate the capital facilities plans of other public entities. This argument misses the
26 point. The overall purpose of the capital facilities element of a comprehensive plan is to
see what is available, determine what is going to be needed, figure out what that will
cost, and determine how the expense will be paid. A simple incorporation of some other

1 entity's plan without then reviewing the entire program in a coordinated manner to
2 ensure consistency and achieve the goals and requirements of the Act would not be in
3 compliance.

4
5 Petitioners also contended that Clark County's stormwater ordinance was insufficient
6 compliance with the requirement of RCW 36.70A.070(1) to "provide guidance for
7 corrective actions to mitigate or cleanse" stormwater runoff. The FSEIS (Ex. 79) at Ch.
8 5, p. 22 stated that:

9 "Currently, most streams in the southern half of the County fail to meet
10 water quality standards. The major source of pollution is runoff from
11 development. The Clark County Storm Water Control Ordinance...will
12 not correct pollution problems caused by existing development."
(emphasis in original)

13 The CP at page 6-8 discussed the existing and future problems associated with
14 stormwater drainage. County documents continually referred to basin plans and
15 strategies contained therein. In order to comply with the Act, the County must
16 implement these strategies through DRs. The County adopted no policies nor DRs to
17 provide solutions to the existing and future problems of stormwater drainage. The
18 County failed to comply with the requirements contained in RCW 36.70A.070(1).

19 Archeological and Historic Preservation

20 RCW 36.70A.020(13) provides:

21 "*Identify* and encourage the *preservation of lands*, sites, and structures,
22 that have historical or archaeological significance." (italics added)

23 Clark County and the cities have adopted CFP 13.2.3 and 13.2.4 which requires the
24 establishment of criteria and programs to identify archeological and historic resources, to
25
26

1 protect those resources, and to establish a process for resolving conflicts between
2 preservation of the resources and development activities.

3
4 Various petitioners challenged the compliance of Clark County, Vancouver and Camas
5 with these provisions. Clark County adopted a "historic archaeological and cultural
6 preservation element" in its CP as did Vancouver (Ex. 651). Camas did not reference
7 this issue in its CP.

8
9 Camas contended that since RCW 36.70A.070 does not require an archaeological and
10 historic preservation element in the comprehensive plan, it had no obligation to address
11 the issue. The argument, as far as it went, is correct. However, it overlooks two
12 essential matters. First, the CFPs referenced above direct that cities will recognize and
13 plan for archaeological and historic preservation. Secondly, we have held from our very
14 first case, *Clark County I*, that the goals of the Act have substantive authority and must
15 be considered and incorporated into all GMA actions. Camas has not complied with the
16 CFP nor with the Act's archaeological goal and therefore is not in compliance.

17 Both Clark County's and Vancouver's CPs recognized the necessity for archaeological
18 and historic preservation. Both also recognized the need for an updated and
19 comprehensive inventory of the area's cultural and historic resources. The last inventory
20 by Clark County was in 1979 and by Vancouver in 1980. Both plans recognized the
21 crucial role played by the Heritage Trust of Clark County, a public non-profit
22 organization chartered in 1982 by Clark County. Both plans also acknowledged the need
23 for regulatory action. At page 53 of Vancouver's CP, implementation measure 1
provided in part:

24 " ...Based on this inventory, develop and implement a comprehensive
25 preservation and management plan and regulations...."

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1 Policy 9.3.3 of Clark County's CP provided:

2 "Revise the zoning ordinance to include provisions to permit the review of
3 individual development, redevelopment and demolition plans to ensure
4 protection and minimize the impacts on cultural, historic and, *particularly*
5 *archaeological* resources." (italics added)

6 This record reveals that none of the actions provided in the CPs were taken. No
7 inventory was initiated, no regulations were reviewed, and the only action taken
8 subsequent to the adoption of the CPs was the disbanding of the Heritage Trust Board.

9 Vancouver did not address these issues in its brief. Clark County raised the specter of
10 Initiative 164. As we stated in the critical areas section of this Order, the GMA does not
11 exempt counties and cities from compliance because of Initiative 164.

12 Clark County and Vancouver are not in compliance with the GMA by their failure to
13 adopt implementing mechanisms as required by their own CPs, the CFPs and the GMA.
14 GMA fundamentally changes the planning concepts previously used in this state. One of
15 those changes is that a comprehensive plan is no longer a binder full of pages that is
16 placed on a shelf, the sole purpose of which is to give someone the responsibility of
17 dusting. If it is in the plan, it must be implemented.

18 Airports

19 The challenges brought by various petitioners under this category involved both a
20 specific designation complaint and more generalized "essential public facilities" issues.
21 The specific designation issue involved a decision by the BOCC to classify land known
22 as the "Clark Aerodrome" as a light industrial area. Petitioners desired a "public
23 facility" designation.
24
25
26

1 The property is located outside the Vancouver city limits but within its UGA. The
2 airport is privately owned but was available for public use. Before the 1994 public
3 hearings were completed, the owner had closed the airport. This closure was
4 acknowledged by the Federal Aviation Administration. The Vancouver Planning
5 Commission, City Council and Clark County Planning Commission had recommended
6 that the property receive a public facilities designation. The basis upon which the BOCC
7 decided to designate the area light industrial is best summarized at page 2 of the
8 intervenor property owner's brief as follows:

9 "The property has been surrounded by encroaching urban development.
10 The designation is wholly consistent with the practical application of the
11 land. It has an industrial park to the north, an active mine to the south
12 and residential to the west and east of the site (within the former flight
13 path). The property immediately to the east (owned by the Intervenor)
14 received approval for a preliminary plat, known as Cedar View with a
condition that a "Covenant Running with the Land" be placed on the
subject property forever to prohibit use of the property for airport
purposes."

15 After review of this record we find that petitioners have not sustained their burden of
16 proof as to this issue. A local government, whether it is a county or a city, has a wide
17 range of discretion in determining specific designations within an UGA under the Act.
18 The GMA establishes many standards as to the establishment of an UGA but provides no
19 goals nor requirements for specific designations within it. Resource lands and even rural
20 areas have particular goals and standards not found for the area within a properly
21 established UGA.

22 Petitioners' generalized issues challenged compliance with GMA requirements for public
23 facilities and the County's CPPs. In accordance with RCW 36.70A.070(6)(b)(i), the CP
24 included an inventory of air transportation facilities and services to define existing
25 capital facilities and travel levels "as a basis for future planning." In addition to that
26

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1 requirement, RCW 36.70A.210(3) requires that the CPPs address county-wide siting of
2 essential public facilities. The County fulfilled both of these requirements.

3
4 RCW 36.70A.200(1) requires that a comprehensive plan "shall include a process for
5 identifying and siting essential public facilities." Airports are contained within the
6 definition of that statute as an essential public facility. Clark County's CP policy 3.3.21
7 directed that a "Clark County Airport Analysis" study be undertaken. The scope of that
8 future study was to include some 6 different matters, one of which was completion of the
9 *1984 Airport Systems* planning effort. The other matters included determining whether
10 to establish airport advisory committee, developing forecasts investigating current and
11 planned land uses, etc. Essentially, the study would be used to decide whether more
12 studies ought to take place and, amazingly, whether the 1984 study ought to be
13 completed. This does not qualify as a process for siting essential public facilities. Clark
14 County is in violation of RCW 36.70A.200(1).

15 Additionally, RCW 36.70A.200(2) provides that neither a comprehensive plan nor a
16 development regulation "may preclude the siting of essential public facilities." Clark
17 County is not in compliance with the GMA because, as to airports, it has violated this
18 subsection.

19 The CP allows an airport as an outright use within urban areas. Regardless of the
20 questionable reality of such a provision, we note that the plan goes no further in
21 restricting incompatible uses surrounding current or future airport sites. As can readily
22 be seen in the quote from intervenor's brief referenced above, the Clark Aerodrome
23 closed largely because of the County's failure to properly regulate the surrounding area.
24 During the hearings on the merits we were provided with an illustration of the Evergreen
25
26

1 Airport flight path showing surrounding urbanization which will likely lead to the same
2 death knell as befell the Aerodrome.

3
4 The concept of "siting" involves future applications but also, particularly in the case of
5 airports, requires efforts towards maintenance of current facilities. Development
6 regulations are an appropriate vehicle to prevent the encroachments that make siting and
7 maintenance of existing public facilities so difficult. On remand Clark County must re-
8 examine its approach to the areas surrounding existing airports.

9
10 This inattention to surrounding areas was dramatically illustrated by a portion of case
11 #95-2-0057 (Sadri/Mill Plain property). The property under challenge in that case was
12 designated residential in the CP. As noted by that petitioner, the property is "directly in
13 the flight path of Clark County's busiest private airport" with the main air strip
14 approximately 100 yards west of petitioner's land. Property north of this airport was
15 being developed as multi and single-family residential, and high density apartment units
16 were being built to the south and east. On remand the BOCC must reconsider this
17 residential designation in light of RCW 36.70A.200(2).

18 Effective Notice and Public Participation

19 Petitioners complained that the effective notice requirements of RCW 36.70A.140 were
20 violated because no specific notice (direct mailing) of proposed designations was made.
21 The GMA does not require a particular methodology of providing for early and
22 continuous public participation. An abundance of information was distributed early and
23 continuously by Clark County (see page 5). Petitioners have failed to show that a
24 violation of the GMA occurred by the failure to directly mail notices to affected property
25 owners.
26

1 Public participation challenges were also made concerning the joint Planning
2 Commission/BOCC hearings. Each hearing between September and December 1994
3 imposed restrictions on oral statements. A 3 minute limitation for each speaker was
4 established, each speaker was allowed only one opportunity to speak and restrictions as
5 to the content of the oral presentation were imposed. We do not find a violation of the
6 GMA public participation goals and requirements because of these restrictions.

7
8 The 3 minute limitation on oral presentations was softened by the availability of
9 unlimited written submissions. In light of the tremendous scope of the CP and DR
10 adoptions, we do not find that the County was required to allow more time to each
11 participant. Although many attorneys complained about the restriction of only one
12 appearance per meeting when multiple representations were the norm, the County was
13 within its discretion, particularly as unlimited written presentations were allowed.

14 At one public hearing, an attorney began his presentation by disputing the County's
15 authority to limit the content of the presentation. The BOCC Chairperson indicated that
16 no oral presentation concerning the imposed restrictions would be allowed and prevented
17 further discussion of this issue. It would have been in keeping with the public
18 participation goals and requirements of the Act to allow a presentation of why the
19 restrictions were inappropriate. However, the County's failure to do so under the
20 circumstances that existed in this record is not a violation of the GMA. RCW
21 36.70A.140 provides that errors in exact compliance shall not be the basis for
22 invalidation if the "spirit of the procedures is observed". This one minor instance of
23 violation of public participation is not sufficient to remand the entire CP.

24 As part of its public participation process, Clark County invited any property owner to
25 submit written comments (objections) to his/her designation established in the draft CP.
26

1 Over 250 individual objections were registered with the County. Many of those
2 property owners became petitioners in this case.

3
4 Various summaries of the individual objections were compiled by planning staff. Some
5 of the objections were accepted and became part of the recommended final draft of the
6 CP. Others were disputed. During its deliberative process, the Planning Commission
7 expressed frustration at the inability to individually deal with each of these objections
8 because of time constraints. Ultimately, the Planning Commission recommended that a
9 special hearing examiner be appointed and a hearing be allowed on each complaint. The
10 BOCC determined that there was sufficient information before them to make a
11 determination on these objections.

12 We find no violation of the Act from the BOCC decision not to appoint a special
13 hearings examiner and/or otherwise provide a hearing on each of these disputes. The
14 record before us reveals that the BOCC had the information available, discussed the
15 information, and exercised appropriate discretion as to the particular method of obtaining
16 and resolving the facts presented by the objections. None of the petitioners sustained
17 their burden of showing that the BOCC failed to comply with the public participation
18 goals and requirements of the Act.

19 Commercial Designations

20 As noted previously, the GMA does not establish goals or requirements for specific
21 designations within a properly established UGA. The scope of discretion to choose from
22 a range of reasonable options is very wide when dealing with this issue. We have
23 carefully reviewed the record with regard to the claims of misdesignations that either
24 allowed or did not allow commercial locations presented by petitioners Ratermann, Sadri
25 (except as noted in the airport section) and the North Salmon Creek Neighborhood
26

1 Association. In none of the cases have petitioners sustained their burden of showing a
2 violation of the GMA. The designations of these areas by Clark County were well
3 within its range of discretion. The GMA does not allow us to substitute a "better
4 choice." We deal only with whether a choice violates the goals and requirements of the
5 Act.

6 7 8 ORDER

9 We have spent many pages of this Order discussing features and decisions found to be
10 not in compliance with the Act. What must not be overlooked is the incredible scope of
11 decisions that were made by the County and the cities that were correctly done. The
12 record continually showed dedication, hard work and intelligence from citizens, staff and
13 elected officials. While there are improvements that can be made, the overall quality of
14 the work is excellent. We acknowledge the efforts of all who participated in this GMA
15 process in Clark County.

16 In order to comply with the Act, the following actions must be taken:
17

18 A. By Clark County:

- 19
- 20 1. Resolve the inconsistency in CP Policies 6.2.2, .3, and .7;
 - 21 2. Eliminate the prohibition of mining within the 100-year floodplain or adopt an
22 analysis which substantiates the prohibition;
 - 23 3. Adopt techniques to buffer resource lands in accordance with the CFP and
24 GMA. Strong consideration must be given to aggregation of nonconforming lot
25 sizes as well as other techniques to reduce the impact of the parcelizations that
26 occurred between 1991 and 1994. Adopt development regulations that prevent
incompatible uses from encroaching on resource land areas;

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4. Increase the minimum lot sizes of rural areas located north of the "rural resource line";
5. Eliminate areas that would have otherwise been designated as resource lands from inclusion in an urban reserve area;
6. Adopt DRs that protect critical areas in addition to the existing wetland ordinance and review them for consistency with the comprehensive plan;
7. Review the existing wetland ordinance for consistency with the comprehensive plan;
8. Adopt the OFM population projection. Revise the number in light of current information over the preceding, now, 4-year period to coincide with the year 2012 expiration date. Reevaluate the rural allocation based upon updated analysis of the effect of prior segregations. Analyze an appropriate relationship between the concept of urban reserve areas and market factors. Restrict the UGA of the City of Camas to its municipal boundary. Eliminate the UGA in the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area. Strongly consider allocating a larger population figure for areas surrounding Vancouver which are already characterized by urban growth, rather than areas surrounding other cities which are only adjacent to areas characterized by urban growth and which have resource lands that require buffering;
9. Reevaluate and appropriately designate the areas between the UGAs of Vancouver and Camas;
10. Specifically identify, after recalculation, the amount of acreage designated as prime. Eliminate the barbell effect of the Ridgefield UGA and the use of resource lands within the UGA. Analyze and evaluate the impact of ESB 5019 on the industrial urban reserve areas and adopt the criteria set forth therein. Strongly consider adoption of development regulations that prohibit the conversion of prime industrial area designations to other uses;
11. Place a 10-year traffic forecast in the comprehensive plan;
12. Comply with the requirements of RCW 36.70A.070(3) in the capital facilities element of the comprehensive plan;
13. Adopt DRs that implement concurrency requirements for potable water supply;

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14. Adopt appropriate DRs to implement the strategies and policies for stormwater drainage issues;
15. Follow the direction of the CFP and GMA in adopting implementation mechanisms for archeological and historic preservation;
16. Comply with the requirements of RCW 36.70A.200 for airport siting and reevaluate the residential designation of the Sadre/Mill Plain property;

B. By Vancouver:

1. Review the critical area ordinance for consistency with the comprehensive plan;
2. Include a 10-year traffic forecast in the comprehensive plan;
3. Adopt implementation mechanisms that implement the archeological and historic preservation policies of the comprehensive plan;
4. Determine appropriate designations for the 5,000 acres of land currently designated industrial which is not suited for that purpose;
5. Adopt appropriate infill DRs to include a transit overlay ordinance;

C. Camas:

1. Adopt a 60/40 ratio of single family to multi-family housing in order to comply with the CFP. Adopt appropriate development regulations to implement that policy;
2. Review the critical area ordinance for consistency with the comprehensive plan;
3. Adopt appropriate implementation mechanisms for archeological and historic preservation;
4. Comply with the stormwater drainage requirements of RCW 36.70A.070(1);

D. Battle Ground:

1. Adopt a 60/40 ratio of single family to multi-family housing in order to comply with the CFP. Adopt appropriate DRs to implement that policy;

2. Adopt appropriate DRs for infill requirements;
3. Adopt DRs for affordable housing requirements;
4. Adopt appropriate policies and DRs for stormwater drainage and flooding as required by RCW 36.70A.070(1);


E. Ridgefield:


1. Adopt a 60/40 ratio of single family to multi-family housing in order to comply with the CFP. Adopt appropriate DRs to implement that policy;
2. Adopt implementing development regulations to further affordable housing requirements.


Because the work necessary to achieve compliance is exhaustive and interrelated, we extend the full 180 day period to the County and cities in order to complete these tasks.

This is a Final Order under RCW 36.70A.300 for purposes of appeal.

So ordered this 20th day of September, 1995.


William H. Nielsen
Presiding Officer


Les Eldridge
Board Member


Nan A. Henriksen (Except Urban Section)
Board Member

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